CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT OF THE ARCTIC REGION

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ABSTRAK

Seiring dengan terjadinya fenomena krisis iklim, Kawasan Arktik menghadapi berbagai peluang dan tantangan baru akibat terbukanya wilayah perairan yang semula tertutup oleh lapisan es. Terbukanya akses terhadap eksplorasi dan eksploitasi sumber daya di kawasan mendorong terjadinya sengketa dan munculnya potensi konflik sebagai dampak dari meningkatnya tensi antar aktor. Hal ini mendorong diperlukannya pengelolaan sengketa dan potensi konflik di Kawasan Arktik karena isu ini melibatkan aktor-aktor berpengaruh dan dapat memiliki implikasi yang lebih luas daripada Kawasan Arktik sendiri. Artikel ini menjelaskan bagaimana sengketa wilayah dan potensi konflik di Kawasan Arktik telah di manajemen oleh aktor di kawasan melalui rangakaian kebijakan sebagai bagian dari mekanisme Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). Studi ini menggunakan analisis kualitatif melalui studi pustaka guna memahami bagaiamana mekanisme CBMs diimplementasikan di Kawasan Arktik guna membantu proses penyelesaiansengketa secara bilateral.

Kata kunci: kawasan, arktik, konflik, sengketa wilayah, confidence-building measures

ABSTRACT

As the climate crisis occurs, the Arctic Region faces new opportunities and challenges due to the opening of water areas originally covered by a layer of ice. Opening access to exploration and exploitation upon resources in the area encourages territorial disputes and puts the whole Arctic Region in potential danger of an open conflict. This had led the Arctic Region in need of disputes management efforts alongside the management of its conflict potential; this is because this issue involves actors with massive influence that could affect not only the Arctic Region but also the rest of the world. This article explains how actors in theregion have managed territorial disputes and potential conflicts in the Arctic Region through a series of policies as part of the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). This study uses qualitative analysis through literature to understand how the CBMs mechanism is implemented in the Arctic Region to assist the bilateral dispute resolution process.

Keywords: arctic, region, territorial disputes, conflict, confidence-building measures

INTRODUCTION

The Arctic Region is frequently understood as a periphery and a stable region. However, as the climate crisis occurs, the Arctic is changing. The climate crisis changes the

situation in the region by transforming the Arctic's harsh environment into a more accessible territory. This condition was made possible by transforming environmental and ecological conditions such as the melting ice sheets and the rise of sea levels. The Arctic Region has become one of the most affected areas following the climate crisis, putting this periphery region at the center of the discourse. In the International Relations study, the significant concern over the part is not limited to the environmental issue. Climate crisis and the ecological transformations it caused pose a security threat to the region.

In the wake of the crisis, the Arctic nations are beginning to realize the region's economic potential. As the ice melts, the frozen ocean gradually turns into open water and becomes more accessible than ever. The prospect of an available and warming arctic includes various sectors, from potential resource extraction to new maritime routes. United States Geographical Survey (USGS) reported that the Arctic Region is estimated to have a significant number of energy resources on the seabed. The report stated that the Arctic seabed is estimated to have approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. (Charpentier, R.R., Klett, T.R., and Attanasi, 2009, p.4) Furthermore, an open Arctic also offers the prospect of a new sea lane that could replace the current route used for international trade. For Instance, the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which connects Europe with Asia through the Russian Northern Coast, has a distance of 8.500 Km compared to the 20.600 Km of the Suez Canal. (Moorman et al., 2016, p. 16)

Nevertheless, most of these economic prospects are located offshore, outside of countries' territorial water and economic Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Consequently, the Arctic nations are looking for other means to acquire their economic interests and compete for access to the Arctic's untapped resources. In 2001, Russian Federation became the first country to submit a claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). This claim is used to extend the outer limit of the continental shelf (OLCS), which therefore gives rights to the claimant over resources on the seabed and subsoil. However, the claim was later suspended in 2002 because it was deemed insufficient evidence and research results. CLCS recommended that Russia conduct further research and submit a revised claim afterward. Over the following years, all the Arctic states, except the USA, submitted their claim over parts of the Arctic Ocean. The USA is incapable of submitting a claim because it has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is the ground framework of the

CLCS.

Despite abiding by international law, territorial claims often overlap with one another. As the case in the Arctic, Russia's claim overlaps with Denmark's and Canada's, while Canada's claim intersects with Denmark's. On the other hand, Norway's and Russia's overlapping claims on the Barents Sea was already resolved in 2010. This situation could lead to territorial disputes between the claimants. Territorial disputes can be non-military by putting legal norms forward. However, enforcing international law through its legal mechanism is also a lengthy process. States can grow impatient and take a more assertive approach, such as projecting hard power through aggressive nationalist posturing and even military build-up.

Consequently, this could turn non-military disputes into Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID). This case is already visible in the Arctic, where Russia is portrayed as the main protagonist. Russia has shown its urgency towards the Arctic by building military bases and conducting military drills. Russia's assertive posturing, however, received NATO's reaction in which it performed joint military exercises with the Nordic countries.

Recent literature on the Arctic has shown debates regarding the future of the Arctic Region. At least there are three different positions on the discussions in regards to this topic; 'the warners,' 'the reassurers,' and 'the inbetweeners.' (Olesen, 2014, p. 6). 'The warners' display a pessimistic standpoint towards the security situations in the Arctic. For instance, following the Russian flag-planting in 2008, many argued that the flag planting is part of provocative Russian actions. These moves were considered dangerous for the peace of the region and therefore the US government should be diplomatically involved in the area. (Borgerson, 2008; Cohen et al., 2008) On the contrary, 'the reassurers' believed that the potential conflict within the Arctic region has been vastly exaggerated. It is because the possible resources in the area are still largely speculative. Moreover, the Arctic region has been one of the most peaceful regions where international law is widely accepted and implemented. (Koivurova, 2011; Young, 2009)

This article takes a side on 'the reassurers' in explaining why the Arctic region's territorial dispute is unlikely to turn into an open conflict. In this study, the author questions the measure taken by the Arctic states in managing the disputes alongside its potential conflict. It aims to explain the gap left by previous research regarding this optimistic

perspective. The author further argues that territorial dispute and potential conflict within the region have been very well managed as the Arctic states practice conflict management in the forms of mutual trust-building through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Since territorial disputes tend to be zero-sum, the author believes that the final and most crucial step towards its settlement lies in a bilateral discussion. Consequently, the purpose of this article is to illustrate what the states can take possible measure to manage potential conflict that originate from territorial disputes.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Territory as a Source of Conflict

Peter Wallensteen defines conflict as a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the exact moment in time an available set of scarce resources. Through this definition, Wallensteen argues that conflict has three components: action, actors, and incompatibility. Conflict can then be understood as an interaction between countries where there is a conflict or disagreement about something. Conflict can be caused by various reasons from ideology, as what happened in the Cold War, to culture, as proposed by Huntington in the post-Cold War era.

Territorial issues, however, have long been considered a constant source of conflict. In his classification, Holsti also included territory – or in his word, Limited Territorial Conflict – as one of six primary sources of conflict. (Holsti, 1986) This argument was later supported by the finding of John Vasquez and Paul Senese, which declared that MID is more common between states that have territorial disputes compared to those that do not. (Senese & Vazquez, 2003, p. 292) Nevertheless, the territorial explanation of conflict and war means that territorial could be an underlying cause and not the proximate cause. The territory is underlying in that it does not immediately produce conflict or war rather it potentially leads to a series of events that eventually result in war. While they may increase the risk of are, Territorial issues will only go to war depending on how they are handled. (Senese & Vazquez, 2003, p.278)

Conflict Resolution and Conflict Management

There are two concepts that are often used to explain managing conflict in

international relations. Those two concepts are conflict management and conflict resolution, in which both of them are strongly related to one another. According to Peter Wallensteen, conflict resolution is "a situation where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other." (Wallensteen, 2002, p. 8) Conflict resolution is therefore meant to resolve the source of the conflict to prevent it from re-escalating in the future.

On the other hand, conflict management means the limitation, mitigation, and containment of conflict. (Tanner, 2000, p. 541) Therefore, Peter Wallensteen and Niklas Swanström further argue that conflict management should also imply a change in states' behavior, from destructive to constructive. (Swanström, 2002, p. 21) Direct measures, such as reducing military forces, third party intervention, informal and formal communication, or Confidence Building Measures, can be designed to handle the conflict and reverse destructive behavior into constructive. For instance, the limitation of militarization, either through a peace treaty or ceasefire, would allow the actors to make a more constructive behavior. These measures would leave the conflict in a non-violent situation where the actors can negotiate at the political level (Zartman, 1997, p. 11) Wallensteen argues that conflict management generally focuses on the military aspects of a conflict. It is because containment and limitation policy refers typically to arms control. However, Swanström believes that conflict management does not need to focus on the military aspect of a conflict or a dispute. He further argues that "as soon as a conflict has been militarized, the momentum has been lost, and the political and economic cost to solve or manage the conflict escalates quickly."(Swanström& Weissmann, 2005, p. 24)

In sum, a conflict can be considered settled - or managed - when the relations between the actors have improved and destructive behaviors curtailed. On the contrary, a conflict is said to be resolved as "the basic structure of the situation that originally gave rise to hostile attitudes and destructive behavior has been reevaluated or perceived anew by the parties in the conflict." (Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004, p. 14) Consequently, conflict management can be enforced as soon as a potential conflict has been identified by the actors and as an effort to reduce tension and prevent further escalation. Conflict management can be directed to conflict settlement or lead to a more complex and durable outcome – conflict resolution.

Confidence-Building Measures and Mutual Trust

In the conflict management process, confidence-building measures (CBMs) are crucial because they increase the mutual trust among the involved actors. CBMs can be understood as a series of actions that are negotiated, agreed upon, and then implemented by the parties involved to build trust without explicitly focusing on the root causes of the problem. (Mason & Siegfried, 2013, p. 58) It includes formal and informal measures, whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, that address, prevent, or resolve uncertainties among states, including military and political elements. These measures reduce uncertainty, misperception, and suspicion and thus help reduce the possibility of incidental or accidental war.

CBMs rely on a 'win-win' approach that responds to all sides' security concern. For example, CBMs were used in the Cold War era in arms control. Consequently, CBMs are often referred to in a 'war' and open conflict context. Nevertheless, it is also argued that CBMs can also be used in any phase in the conflict cycle. (Wolff, 2009) In the implementation of the CBMs, there are four aspects that the involving actors should demonstrate; willingness to talk, willingness to listen, willingness to meet the other's needs, and willingness to improve the relationship. (Landau & Landau, 1997, p. 98-102) These four aspects can also be understood as indicators of the states' behavior involved in an international agreement. Those indicators are; exchange of information, communication procedure, rights to observe, and efforts to stabilize. Exchange of data means that involving actors agreed to share information regarding the activity and policy concerning relevant issues. The procedure of communication furthermore organizes the means of communication regarding the delivery and exchange of the agreed statement. Rights to observe regulates the observation activity, usually related to defense and security activity and could in be form of policy drafts or observation on military exercises ,However, the procedure must still be carried out by prioritizing the principle of confidentiality considering that confidentiality of information is an essential element in defense and security policies and activities. Last ,of all, efforts to stabilize means involving actors have a willingness to create a peaceful and stable reg the ion. Consequently, the whole mechanism of CBMs requires continuous and sustainable measurese to work well. In addition, the role and participation of the parties involved in related issues determine determine mechanism works.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study is based on a qualitative method to explain the process of conflict management throughthe CBMs mechanism in the Arctic Region. Library research or literature study is used in this re collection method to collect relevant information and data. In that case, the data used in this study are mostly obtained from onlinmainlynals, articles, books, and selected news resources. Consequently, this research used secondary data from academically reliable sources.

These data are later analyzed with the concepts and frameworks used in this study to identify whether they correlate with the research contents described by the author. In the process, data were analyzed using qualitative analysis techniques as the empirical data obtained by the author are mainly in the form of a collection of words and series of numbers; qualitative data. Such analysis is also conducted with an inductive method to find the results with a specific-to-general way of thinking. Data that have beenanalyzed are later presented in a descriptive way to explain the conflict management process through the implementation of CBMs to build mutual trust among actors in the region.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Arctic Region and Its Geopolitical Importance.

The Arctic Region is commonly understood as an area within the Arctic Circle, a line of latitude about 66,5° north of the Equator. Consisting of 33 million Km^2 of space, this region consists of eight countries: United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland. This region also consists of various potential natural resource,s from fisheries to oil and gas. The 'new' open water also offersshorter maritime routes from Europe to Asia, such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR,) which could be an alternative to the current routescourses via Suez.

As the impact of the ongoing climate crisis, the region is experiencing significant chanrms of its geological conditions. The oncontinuedelting of Arctic's ice cap and the expansion of open water are could potentially put countries within the region into a race towards dominion over Athe rctic region.shownowedin Figure 1, eagovernmenttry within the rhasn startedtated their claim upon these 'new' open territory as their means in taking over its potential resource. These claims often overlap with one another, which ,nurtures

tension and creates distrust between respective countries.

Perception and Mutual Trust

Awareness of potential conflict in the Arctic region ararisesollowing an interpretation oofmisperception and suspicion shown by the states in the region towards one another. Such states behavior is quite noticeable throughout delimitation disputes in the CLCS, but particularly visible followingthe Russian flag-planting incident. In this sense, perception is an essential variable in understanding the arguments and the whole dynamics in the Arctic region. It is not limited to the perception of the states towards one another but also states perception uofthe situation and the condition of the regionarea. This perception is limited to the region's factual condition, but it also can be a reality faced by a country.

These perceptions are commonly explained in and through policy made by the respective states. For example, as climate crisis occurs and causecauses the opening access in the Arctic water, there are growing concerns and a few policy changes regarding this particular issue. These policies also include theobjectives and goals of the respective states.


Figure 1 Geopolitical Maps of the Arctic Region. Source: Arctic Monitoring & Assessment Programeme withDurham University

For instance, the Russian Federation demonstrated the urgency of the Arctic Region in two documents published in September 2008 and May 2009, entitled The Foundations of the Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond and The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020. These two documents explain Russia's national interest in implementing Russia's New Arctic Strategy, which is the basis for increasing various activities in the Arctic region. The Foundations of the Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond listed the four interests of Russia. The first interest relates to natural resources in the Arctic region. The second is "the preservation of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation. The third is "the protection of the unique ecological system of the Arcti.". The fourth relates to the northern sea route as an international sea route. (Russian Presidential Executive Office, 2009) On the other hand, Canada, Denmark, and Norway also show intentions in strengthening regional cooperation to preserve the peaceful Arctic.

Despite a significant focus on defense and security issues, through its policy, Russia still shows its attention to thpointue of the climate crisis by making the protection of the ecological system in the Arctic one of its interests. Furthermore, in its strategy, Russia also stated that one of the primary objectives of Russia's strategy in the Arctic is in the field of environmental security, namely "the preservation and protection of the natural ecosystem of the Arctic, and the mitigation of the ecological consequences of increased economic activity and global climate change."(Farber, 2018)

Moreover, the situation in the Arctic region is not only affected by the policy changes ,but sometimes it is also affected by the rational actor involved within the government. For instance, US concern over the Arctic region only became visible during the Obama administration, particularly in 2013 when the Department of Defense (DOD) released their National Strategy for the Arctic Region. However, during the Trump Administration, this perception and policy became questionable following his skepticism upon climate crisis. Following the election of Joe Biden as the new US President nevertheless reverses on US perception and policy into a similar stance to US perception and policy into a similar stance to the Obamaera had already visible.

Differences in perceptions of regional conditions and the situation at hand, both on the climate crisis or the security situation in the region, will affect the process of managing

disputes and potential conflicts in the Arctic Region. Therefore, it is necessary to align each country's perception on the situation and condition of the region. Acknowledging the phenomenon of the climate crisis and implementing commitments to regional security through cooperation and cooperation can be the first step to face these opportunities and challenges.

Implementation of CBMs in the Arctic Region

To assess the implementation of CBMs in the Arctic Region, the four indicators are used to determine the attitudes and efforts of countries in the region. Firstly, declaration of information can be fulfilled through transparency between part. This ich can be done by publishing white papers, reporting on the arms registry, and other notification efforts related to defense and security activities. This has primarily been achieved by publishing foreign policies or political and security strategies in the Arctic Region by individual countries. However, the commitment to implementing the policy publication also needs to be re-emphasized so that it functions as lip service. In addition, the willingness of each actor, not only to avoid conflict but also to implement a foreign policy that prioritizes cooperation, also needs to be emphasized to each party in the region.

Next, procedures of communication procedures can be achieved through periodic bilateral dialogues or multilateral forums to to and security issues. On 27 – 29 May 2008, Denmark held a ministerial-level meeting that brought together the five coastal states in the Arctic and produced the Ilulissat Declaration. This declaration emphasizes the position of the Arctic Region regarding the phenomenon of the climate crisis and its implications for ecosystems in the region ,as well as regarding the legal regime that regulates the issue of regional jurisdiction regarding overlapping territorial claims. Furthermore, this declaration also states that "The five coastal states are currently cooperating closely in the Arctic Ocean with each other and with other interested parties" and the cooperation carried out includes, among others, "collection of scientific data concerning the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment and other scientific research." The statement does not indicate cooperation in the field of defense and security in the Arctic Region, so this is a deficiency that should be corrected.

The lack of focus on defense and security was then stated through the Kiruna

Declaration following the eighth ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council, which was held in Kiruna, Sweden, on 15 May 2013. Through this declaration, all member countries of the Arctic Council recognized the importance of maintaining peace, stability, and cooperation constructive in the Arctic Region. Furthermore, this Declaration also emphasizes the importance of increasing the role of the Arctic Council in relations between actors in the Arctic Region, in particular as a leading forum in discussing international cooperation in the region.

Apart from various commitments related to cooperation between actors in the region, there has been no action or multilateral forum discussing defense and security issues. The Arctic Council explicitly excludes defense and security discussions because it is considered outside the Council's mandate. Exclusion upon the debate on defense and security issues is also because the security challenges faced by the Arctic Region are somewhat caused by non-traditional security aspects such as energy, health, and the environment. These non-traditional aspects have become the focus of the Arctic Council. The appropriate resolution and handling of these non-traditional issues are considered to be able to prevent the escalation of traditional defense and security in the form of military threats.

The next indicator is the right to observe ,which is related to information and communication. This can be done by forming a defense cooperation committee whose function is to oversee aspects of cooperation in the field of defense and security. This committee can be a forum for dialogue and consultation on the security interests of the parties involved. Although the Arctic Council does not discuss defense and security issues, there is the Athe Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) for security consultations between parties in the Arctic Region. This forum has been going on since 2011 and involves 12 countries. In 2014 Russia's participation in this forum was suspended following the annexation of Crimea. Russia's position, which is no longer interested in this forum ,causes ASFR to be unable to run as expected, considering that Russia's role in opposition to other European countries makes this forum only bring together state actors from the same party. Furthermore, since the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Crimea, relations between Russia and the West, particularly in military-to-military contacts, have deteriorated and various forms of security dialogue (including the NATO-Russia Council and OSCE) have stalled or hampered. Inviting Russia back to this forum by prioritizing discussion on military transparency and prevention and handling of incidents and conflicts can be very useful in building trust or in

other visions such as creating the Arctic Military Code of Conduct (AMCC).

Efforts of stabilization include various endeavors to fulfill and realize communication declarations to observation procedures. It has already been done in numerous ways ,such as bilateral policy consultations, cooperation in Search and Rescue (SAR) efforts, or cooperation in providing humanitarian assistance. It is therefore not limited to defense and security agreements. The final form of stabilization efforts is usually off a bilateral agreement or a multilateral agreement. Such effortactionst have to be an agreement related to regional peace but can be an haveller scope. An agreement with a smaller size is more effective in building mutual trust because there is less discussion and consideration between part,ies so an agreement is more likely to be reached. Various sectoral agreements in the Arctic Region ranging from the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic or International Maritime Organization (IMO) Agreement on International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters have been agreed sequentially in 2017, 2011, and 2015.

The absence of an agreement regarding military cooperation in the Arctic Region may have occurred because of the assumption that the Arctic Region is a zone of calm and minimal conflict under the phrase "High North, low tensions." However, it must be acknowledged that there has been a change in the situation and the condition of the area has become tenser, which may be described by new phrases such as "High North, with growing tensions".

Bilateral Efforts

As a follow-up to implementing the CBMs mechanism, the management of disputes and potential conflicts can be carried out through bilateral or multilateral diplomacy. Efforts made bilaterally include the process of negotiation or mediation and various forms of bilateral dialogue. Multilateral dialogue related to defense and security issues can and has been carried out through instruments like the Arctic Council or ASRF. Meanwhile, bilaterally, discussion related to defense and security issues has not been carried out by the disputing parties in the Arctic Region. Bilateral efforts are considered the most appropriate efforts to discuss border and territorial issues that are zero-sum and tend to be sensitive. Bilateral agreements regarding the demarcation of territorial boundaries or borders in the Arctic

Region have been reached several times by countries in the Region. Examples of bilateral efforts and agreements born in the Arctic Region are the agreement between Denmark and Canada in 1973 and the Treaty of Norway and Russia in 2010.

The agreement between Norway and Russia could be considered a model due to its relevance to the current development of the situation and conditions in the Arctic Region. Formally known as the Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Marine Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, the agreement was reached following the recommendation issued by the CLCS in 2009 based on the Norway continental shelf claim in the Barents Sea. This agreement also ends a long-standing dispute between Norway and Russia since the 1970s.

The preferences of the two countries in the dispute in the Barents Sea include two things, namely, disputes over territorial boundaries in the form of an exclusive economic zone (which determines the rights of resource exploitation) and the boundaries of the thelimitsal shelf (which determinedefinedetermine define the rights of exploration and exploitation of resources at the bottom and beSea). sea) so that this dispute is more accurately referred to as a "marine delimitation dispute" or "boundary dispute" and not a "border dispute".." (Moe et al., 2011, p. 148)

In a long process, the first bilateral effort between the two countries was carried out by Norway, which proposed negotiations to Russia regarding this region in 1967. Informal meeting, s which became the first dialogue between the two countries, only took place in 1970, while the formal meeting between the two countries was held for the first time in 1970. 1974. Dialogue and negotiations between the two countries that lasted a long time accompanied various deadlocks and occasionally progressed. The talks developed when the two countries agreed to revise the Varangerfjord Treaty of 1957 to extend the sea boundary by 30 kilometers from the VarangerfjordHardangerfjord in the Barents Sea. This agreement has a vital role in reaching a final agreement between the two countries in 2010. The boundary point agreed in 2007 was then used as a reference for the agreed middle line – the equidistance line[1] - and was stated in Article 1 of the agreement between the two countries.

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[1] According to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Equidistance can be defined "as the line every point ofwhich is equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each of the Two States is measured." Therefore, the boundary line agreed upon by the two countries is determined using agreement on a series of points that form a sequence where

Despite 'the warners' arguments that territorial disputes threaten the stability and security of the Arctic Region and potential conflict, broad experience in the Arctic shows that border issues can be settled peacefully through bilateral agreements that comply with international law. The case of boundary agreement and cooperation between Norway and Russia can be evidence of this assumption. Furthermore, through the dynamics and intensity, it can be seen that the countries in the Arctic Region only use diplomatic efforts, legal arguments, and some symbolic steps (planting flags, military parades, military exercises) in this dispute. The actions of each actor in fulfilling their respective interests realistically will still be able to produce the perception that the actor can be a threat to other actors, even when the actor is cooperative and behaves cooperatively.

So far, it has been seen that each actor shows commitment through various efforts to resolve disputes and manage potential conflicts that prioritize legal principles. If each party still sees the other party as a threat, this can lead to misinterpretation of reality and lead to self-fulfilling prophecies that can lead to an actual increase in the potential for conflict. However, the case in the Barents Sea, which ended with an agreement on demarcation of territorial boundaries and cooperation, shows that demonstrations of military power tend to have an insignificant impact, so that association tends to be the choice of actors. This also indicates that the process and mechanism of CBMs to harmonize the perception of each actor in the region towards the climate crisis and each other is quite successful. In addition, the choice made by each actor to continue to prioritize international norms and law must have a background. Two reasons make cooperation a better option than an unstable situation caused by conflict.

First, the potential of the Arctic Region generally includes living marine resources, such as fisheries, as well as oil and gas. Exploration and exploitation of these two types of resources not only have thee potential for economic benefit ands their threats. For example, extracting oil and gas for later use as fuel will amplify global warming sweeping the world and significantly impacting the Arctic Region. In addition, sustainable resource management is required for the Arctic Region because the Arctic region's development will take longer than the time predicted by many observers based on the trend of melting ice sheets in the region.

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each point has the same distance from the coastline/coastal of each party.

The development process related to the exploitation of resources in the area can take a relatively long time due to the calculation of economic benefits and impacts or costs on the environment.

Second, the economic potential of other Arctic Regions, namely alternative maritime routes, can only operate and become an option if the Region is stable. Therefore, increasing multi-sectoral cooperation and cooperation in the region, especially defense and security, is the only way to take advantage of the potential of existing alternative routes. On the other hand, the exploitation of resources in the region will also run better if the area is in a stable political environment and based on international law. Unresolved territorial or border disputes also have their impacts and implications for the bilateral and multilateral relations of the disputing countries. This is because territorial boundary disputes bind the political and administrative capacities of the disputing state. Overall, regional stability and ale resolution of territorial boundary disputes incentivize every party in the region. This can only be achieved through the willingness of each actor to play an active role in efforts to manage disputes and potential conflicts and be fully committed to them. Incentives for regional stability can also encourage every actor in the region to be involved in efforts to manage disputes and potential conflicts in the Arctic Region.

CONCLUSION

Territorial disputes in the Arctic Region are currently managed within the framework of international organization and by the international law. In general, disputes that occur in the Arctic Region are carried out through a series of diplomatic efforts, legal arguments, and several symbolic steps. The dynamics of disputes in the Arctic Region in general oversee the legal argumentation process carried out by each party through formal submissions to CLCS as an international body that implements UNCLOS related to maritime boundaries. The potential conflict due to the growing tension is however normal as a form of interaction, particularly to neighboring country with close proximity. Apart from that, various efforts to resolve disputes and manage conflicts in the region have been carried out to turn destructive disputes and potential conflicts into constructive interaction. In the process of managing disputes and potential conflicts, the mechanism of confidence-building measures (CBMs) is carried out to build trust between parties so that each party, especially the disputing party, can then

resolve the dispute they have.

CBMs are necessary because CBMs can be the first step in changing tense relationships between actors to a more accommodating one. The steps taken are generally in the nature of or lead to a bilateral settlement because often the issues discussed are sensitive so that bilateral efforts are considered to be the most appropriate efforts to take. CBMs can be supported by multilateral forums and sectoral agreements such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, with the aim of encouraging each party to cooperate on a smaller scale. This is done with the hope that the disputing countries can then reach a more substantial agreement regarding the dispute, as Norway and Russia did in 2010 or rather as Denmark and Canada agreed in 1973.

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