

**THE UTILIZATION OF DIGITAL DIPLOMACY OF NON-STATE ACTORS: CASE
STUDY OF THE UNITED LIBERATION MOVEMENT FOR WEST PAPUA
(ULMWP)**

Dina Militia Cristy Sagala

President University

dinachristy.dc@gmail.com

Riski M. Baskoro

President University

riskibaskoro@president.ac.id

Abstrak

Selain memiliki kekayaan alam yang melimpah, Papua memiliki berbagai permasalahan seperti kurangnya fasilitas dan infrastruktur yang memadai. Menurut Viartasiwi, hal-hal tersebut merupakan salah satu faktor utama dibalik munculnya gerakan separatis Papua dan Papua Barat. Terdapat beberapa gerakan separatis Papua dan Papua Barat dengan berbagai macam metode dan ideologi yang dianutnya seperti OPM, KNPB, and ULMWP. United Liberation Movement for West Papua atau ULMWP adalah salah satu gerakan non-kekerasan terbesar dari gerakan separatis Papua. Kelompok ini mencoba mengangkat isu Papua ke masyarakat internasional untuk mendapatkan dukungan bagi kemerdekaan Papua Barat. Dalam upaya mencapai tujuannya, ULMWP memanfaatkan platform digital seperti membuat domain situs web independen dan kampanye dari akun Twitter "diplomat" dan Juru Bicara mereka. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui bagaimana konsep diplomasi digital dalam menganalisis pemanfaatan platform digital oleh ULMWP untuk mencapai tujuannya. Untuk menjawab pertanyaan tersebut, penelitian ini akan menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif dengan meninjau platform digital ULMWP yaitu dari akun Twitter para tokoh utama ULMWP dan dari situs web resmi mereka, serta dibantu dengan aplikasi pengolah data sosial media NVivo. Penelitian ini akan menggunakan konsep diplomasi digital oleh Todorovska yang membahas tentang gerakan separatis yang menggunakan diplomasi digital dalam mencapai tujuannya. Pada hasil akhir penelitian ini ditemukan bahwa aktor non-negara seperti gerakan separatis ULMWP dapat menggunakan diplomasi digital untuk mewujudkan tujuannya.

Kata Kunci: Diplomasi Digital, Aktor Non-Negara, Gerakan Separatis, ULMWP.

ABSTRACT

Besides having abundant natural wealth, Papua has various problems, such as the lack of supportive facilities and infrastructure. According to Viartasiwi, these things are one of the main factors behind the emergence of the Papua and West Papua separatist movements. There are several Papua and West Papua separatist movements with various methods and ideologies they adhere to, such as OPM, KNPB, and ULMWP. The ULMWP, or the United Liberation Movement for West Papua, is one of the most significant non-violent movements of the Papuan separatist movement. The group tried to raise the issue of Papua towards the international society to gain support for the independence of West Papua. To achieve their goal, the ULMWP utilized digital platforms such as creating their website domain and campaigns from the Twitter accounts of their "Diplomats" and Spokesperson. This research aimed to discover how the digital diplomacy concept analyzes the utilization of the digital platform by the ULMWP to achieve its goal. To answer this question, this study will use qualitative research methods by reviewing the digital platform used by ULMWP, which is from the Twitter accounts of the main ULMWP figures and their official website, and assisted by the NVivo social media data processing application. This study will use the concept of digital diplomacy by Todorovska, which discusses the separatist movement that uses digital diplomacy to achieve its goals. In the final result of this study, it was found that non-state actors, such as the ULMWP separatist movement, can use digital diplomacy to achieve their goals.

Keywords: Digital Diplomacy, Non-State Actor, Separatist Movement, ULMWP.

Introduction

Papua is a province located at the easternmost tip of Indonesian territory, rich in natural resources, forests, mining, and marine products (Kartikasari et al., 2012). However, in development in Papua, there are still several problems related to the condition of its people, such as low levels of education and unequal health facilities, inadequate quality of infrastructure, and high levels of crime due to security disturbances by the separatist movement in Papua (Digdowiseiso, 2021). In addition, Viartasiwi (2018) found that these factors led to the background reasons for the emergence of the resistance of some Papuan people. Beforehand, Papua itself is not included in the territory of Indonesia directly after Indonesian independence.

From 1945 to 1963, Papua was still part of the Dutch East Indies, so Indonesia struggled to liberate the Dutch territory. President Soekarno announced the promulgation of Tri Komando Rakyat (TRIKORA) to defend and liberate the Papua region from Dutch colonialism on 19th August 1961 (Solossa, 2006). Since then, there have been frequent armed conflicts between the Indonesian and Dutch militaries over Papua. On 15th August 1962, the 'New York Agreement' was approved between the Netherlands and Indonesia, mediated by the United Nations, which contained the surrender of West Irian (now called West Papua) from the Netherlands to Indonesia. The transfer of power is supervised through the UN interim government, namely the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority

(UNTEA), which ended on 01st May 1963 (Saltford, 2003). The transfer of authority, however, demanded Indonesia to hold an Act of Free Choice or self-determination, which contains whether the people of West Irian chose to unite and integrate with the Republic of Indonesia as one of the points of the New York agreement. This agreement is manifested in the People's Opinion Determination (*Pepera*) held in 1969 (Solossa, 2006).

Although there has been official international recognition of Papua as an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia, it turns out that the threat of national disintegration in Papua and West Papua is still unresolved. The security threat in Papua is an issue that has become a concern for the Indonesian government since the entry of Papua into the Republic of Indonesia. The fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural rights is colored by various problems that never end. Moreover, the uneven development of infrastructure gives some areas limited access because geographical conditions open up opportunities for armed criminal groups to operate freely in these locations (Bramasta, 2021). Civilians living near conflict zones will also experience tension in the region. Due to the situation similar to living in a war zone, any events and programmes that will benefit the Papua region will be hindered. Therefore, with the presence of these armed groups in Papua and West Papua, the peace and security of the people will be significantly disturbed (Supriatma, 2013).

The Papuan Separatist Terrorist Group (KSTP) or the West Papua Liberation Army-Free Papua Organization (TPNPB-OPM) is a group that often spreads terror to civilians and the Indonesian Armed Forces and the Republic of Indonesia Police in the Papua region. This group was formed in 1965, and the establishment of the OPM resulted from the Dutch government's influence during the reign of Resident J. P. Eechoud, who succeeded in building a Papuan elite called pro-Papua. This is because the Dutch promised independence to West Papua in the 1970s. Still, the New York Agreement hindered the independence of West Papua, which resulted in Papua and West Papua becoming part of Indonesian territory (Saltford, 2003). OPM's goal is to separate from Indonesia and reject economic development and modernity in Papua (Asaribab, 2014, p. iii). In addition, many actions have been carried out by OPM and caused many conflicts in various areas in Papua. These conflicts caused many casualties resulting in the response of military operations due to OPM actions that have endangered many people's lives.

Moreover, this has led to frequent clashes between the OPM and the Indonesian military and security forces. This group is also a combination of several other separatist movements, which include the State Group of the Federal Republic of West Papua (NRFPB), the West Papua National Liberation Coalition (WPNLC), and the National Parliament of West Papua (NPWP). One group in line with the OPM discussed in this journal is the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) because it is the most prominent non-violent secession movement organization of West Papua with an international influence (Pedrason, 2022). However, it is crucial to note that the ULMWP is not the same as OPM,

although they are fighting for the secession of West Papua. This group was formed on 07th December 2014, initiated by Benny Wenda (ULMWP, 2021). This group was formed to achieve the independence of West Papua and move through diplomatic means on an international basis. This group also tries to get international attention through online platforms that can be found on several social media platforms, such as the independent website they founded and Twitter (ULMWP, 2021). Therefore, the research question for this paper will be, "How does the ULMWP utilize digital platforms to gain political support for the independence of West Papua from international society?".

Literature Review

Although Papua is one of the provinces with abundant natural resources, the problem of economic, social, and cultural inequality and the lack of infrastructure development are some of the main issues in Papua Province (Yanuarti, 2012). This problem is also the main reason for the emergence of the Papuan separatist movement known as OPM (Viartasiwi, 2018). The emergence of this separatist movement later became one of the problems for the stability of the Indonesian state and is one of the internal conflicts in Indonesia, as explained by Mardiani et al. (2021), whose team researched the Papuan separatist movement (OPM) and its actions. However, there is a lack of discussion regarding the non-violent method of this separatist movement in achieving its goal.

The non-violent method has been used by various resistance movements around the world. This can be seen in the case of Poland's Revolution movement in the 1980s, which was discussed by Piekalkiewicz (2019). The movement utilized the methods of civil resistance, which were then able to achieve their goal of political realignment (Smolar, 2009). Furthermore, non-violent methods have also been used by separatist movements, resistance groups, and extremist groups to achieve their goals (Schmid, 2014; Hardiman, 2013; Bourne, 2021). The Catalan Separatist group is one of the examples of non-violent methods to achieve their political goal (Agustín & Raftopoulos, 2021). Della Porta et al. (2017) then uncovered that the Catalan Separatist movement utilized digital platforms to gain support from the international society, which is still ongoing. Another research by Todorovska (2015) also discussed this phenomenon where a separatist movement utilizes digital platforms as a tool to achieve their agenda with the help of public diplomacy lens, specifically with digital diplomacy.

As MacLeod (2010) discussed, apart from using armed means or violent methods in which they spread terror and fear towards the Papuan citizens, the Papuan separatist movement also uses a non-violent method to achieve their goal. Lantang and Tambunan (2020) then discovered that the Papuan Separatist movement utilized digital media in conveying and spreading their messages to the international society. The messages itself contain messages to influence the perspective of the international society about how the Indonesian government behaves towards the Papuan people in the

hope of gaining international attention and sympathy to gain political support from the international society (Pedrason, 2022; Lantang and Tambunan, 2020; Nainggolan, 2014).

However, until now, no research has examined the non-violent efforts carried out by the ULMWP as one of the groups in line with the OPM from the lens of public diplomacy or, specifically, digital diplomacy. This research tried to seek further elaboration regarding Todorovska's research on the utilization of digital platforms by the secession movement to support their cause. This will hopefully expand the understanding of non-state actors interacting in international relations. Where the ULMWP establishes a website to gather international political support and use social media, especially Twitter, to win the sympathy of the international society. Moreover, it is related to the specific roles of several actors who initiated the ULMWP movement, such as Benny Wenda, a journalist who often covered the ULMWP movement such as Victor Mambor, as well as ULMWP "diplomats" scattered in various countries. Finally, future research could elaborate more on other secession movement study cases to expand the concept of the interaction between state and non-state actors in an anarchic world of international relations.

Theoretical Framework

In an anarchic world of International Relations, interactions occur between state and non-state actors interchangeably. In the explanation of non-state actors, there are several actors who can interact in international relations, such as NGOs, MNCs, IGOs, and national identity groups (Rom, Hidaka, & Walker, 2022). According to Rom, Hidaka, & Walker (2022), national identity groups are people who share a common ethnic, religious, or linguistic identity and object to the political or territorial status quo and sometimes struggle for greater autonomy or recognition. National identity groups may seek regional autonomy (relative independence from a central government), secession (breaking away from a state), or irredentism (reclaiming land). The secessionist or separatist movement is a national identity group seeking sovereignty as an independent state (Rom, Hidaka, & Walker, 2022).

Todorovska (2015), in his research, has managed to elaborate on where a secessionist movement conducts public diplomacy by utilizing digital platforms as a method for the secessionist movement to rally international support to support their secession from the mother state using the study case of the Catalan separatist movement. Furthermore, Nelson (2021) discovered that diplomatic support from a fully sovereign state is pivotal for a secessionist movement to successfully secede.

By utilizing Todorovska's (2015) research, this then enabled this research to discover the phenomenon where the ULMWP (United Liberation Movement for West Papua) where seeks the secession of West Papua by rallying diplomatic support by internationalizing the issue with Public Diplomacy or specifically Digital Diplomacy.

According to Signitzer and Coombs (1992), public diplomacy is a way for state and non-state actors in international relations to influence public attitudes and opinions through direct or indirect means. The theory then developed as technology more advanced, where a phenomenon in which an actor, both state and non-state actor, uses digital media to achieve his goals with soft power in the international system known as 'digital diplomacy' (Bjola and Holmes, 2015). Bjola and Holmes (2015) then defined three main components to define digital diplomacy: 1) How actors engage with their target audiences to project its message; 2) How different public and private sectors organize information; 3) How actors acquire information to monitor changes in political structures and public opinion. There are three variables in Pratkanis (2008) argue as the parameter of public diplomacy. First is when an actor is advertising to develop a favorable image (branding) towards the international society. Second is when an actor raises awareness of an issue or entity to create a good impression or certain issue with public relations attempts. Last is when an actor tries to influence social opinion with a campaign to align the social perspective with the actor's perspective.

Meanwhile, Leonard, Stead, and Smewing (2002) set the indicators when public diplomacy is succeeded is when the actor manages to change its target perception which is aligned with the actor's perspective to achieve a certain goal. In the case of ULMWP, it is when the group gained recognition and gained more support towards its cause with its close ties with Vanuatu and the MSG or the Melanesian Spearhead Group. To further rally diplomatic support, the ULMWP also utilized digital platforms such as establishing their website domains and using Twitter as the social media account for the group to spread out its messages to internationalize the issue, which will be discussed in the later section of this research.

Research Method

Qualitative data collecting will be used mainly by observation to provide relevant data for this research. There will be three sources of data, which can be separated into primary, secondary, and tertiary data. The primary source of data is from the Twitter accounts of the ULMWP main figures with the help of NVivo social media data processing application to extract the keywords which contain campaign activity or narrative to measure the campaign's intensity. The secondary data will be from the ULMWP website. The tertiary data will be news articles and other reliable internet sources. Furthermore, the data collected will be the primary support for this proposed research's argument.

Discussion

The ULMWP Utilizing Website Domain

The ULMWP operates social media as a digital diplomacy tool using one of its official websites, www.ULMWP.org. On the website's homepage, it is very clearly stated the group's political intention,

where they declared that they are fighting to gain full sovereignty for West Papua. Through this declaration of intention called as *Saralana Declaration on West Papua unity*. With this, it can be proved that they can be categorized as "quasi-state". Within this *Saralana Declaration on West Papua unity*, they declared that they would coordinate every necessary action to gain international society's support.

Moreover, this website contains information related to the latest news related to West Papua and the institution, including history, main figures, and documents that show this issue from their perspective. This website is also intended for international society, particularly international political support, who are interested in their goals (ULMWP Staff, 2021). It can be seen in **Figure 1**, which is highlighted *"If you are an elected Government representative, you can add your signature to the Westminster Declaration by filling out the form"*.




Figure 1 The ULMWP's website looks (ULMWP Staff, 2021).

The Westminster Declaration (**Appendix A**) was prepared and signed by several ULMWP representatives and "Government representatives" from several countries in the Pacific and several countries in Europe on 03rd May 2016. This Westminster Declaration contains statements regarding rejecting human rights violations in West Papua and reclaiming their right to self-determination. In the declaration, they also stated that they did not accept the 1969 'Act of Free Choice' because it was considered a serious violation and was against their principles. In addition, they claim that in this vote, in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541 (XV), and expect the international society to take immediate action in support of their independence.

Meanwhile, the recent total of the ULMWP's website visits from June until August 2022 is approximately 5.000 visitors.

Country	Traffic Share
United Kingdom	65.31%
United States	21.43%
Australia	13.26%

Table 1: Data from June 2022 to August 2022
(Source: Retrieved from pro.similarweb.com, 2022)

From the table above, most website visitors can be traced with IP addresses from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia. However, there is no IP address from Indonesia because the website is blocked by the Indonesian government (ULMWP Staff, 2021).

The ULMWP Utilizing Twitter Domain

The ULMWP also operates another social media platform: Twitter App, which aims to reach a broader audience to gain more support for their cause, especially from politicians and journalists. This is because Twitter has become more popular and has more impact than Websites. This is based on a report from Twitter that there are as many as 450 million monthly active users by 2022 (Iqbal, 2022). This research utilizes data retrieved from @FreeWestPapua, @BennyWenda, and @VictorcMambor's Twitter accounts, and the data result reached approximately 9.498 tweets from December 2014 to October 2022.

Word	Count	Weighted Percentage (%)
https	9605	6,27
#westpapua	2685	1,75
#freewestpapua	1593	1,04
colonial	411	0,27
papuans	375	0,24
#papuanlivesmatter	244	0,16
genocide	234	0,15

Table 2: Data from December 2014 to October 2022

(Source: NVivo social media analytic tool, 2022)

The data above indicate some keywords that may be linked to the campaign which the ULMWP conducted to internationalize the West Papua independence movement. The "https" dominates the number of keywords that are often used because each author often provides their narration from a link to a news article related to the activities of the ULMWP program or also related to an incident in West Papua. The author finds that most of the news attached contains false information and, if not biased. Trends #westpapua, #FreeWestPapua, and #papuanlivesmatter are also used in each of their Tweets to make it easier for the "target" audience to find the topic. There are also many Tweets containing "hate speech" towards the Indonesian Government apparatus with some threatening messages.

- @FreeWestPapua's Twitter Account

The Twitter account @FreeWestPapua is one of the official ULMWP accounts on Twitter. This Twitter account started in September 2009, with 67,900 followers and 6.820 following so far (Free West Papua, 2022). In the Bio of this Twitter account, there is a statement that is *"Global campaign supporting the right to self-determination for West Papuans and exposing the ongoing genocide being committed by Indonesia. #FreeWestPapua"*. This Twitter account is intended primarily for the international society who want to get information about what is actually

happening in West Papua. As shown in Appendix B, it is very clear that they are seeking the attention of the wider society, especially the international political society, to support their campaign to achieve independence for West Papua. Moreover, the @FreeWestPapua account has also uploaded several Tweets related to actions carried out by the Indonesian government in West Papua, which is considered to be against international law (one of the examples is in **Figure 2**). With this, it can lead to the emergence of a negative perspective from the broader society toward the Indonesian government.




Figure 2 The @FreeWestPapua's Tweet (Free West Papua, 2022).

In another upload, as shown in **Figure 3**, they have also succeeded in getting political support from foreign government figures. Therefore, this proves that using a digital diplomacy (through Twitter) strategy can influence social opinion about an issue or entity so that support from the social society is obtained.



Figure 3 The @FreeWestPapua's Tweet (Free West Papua, 2022).

- @BennyWenda's Twitter Account

ULMWP also carried out its digital diplomacy strategy on the personal Twitter account of one of the main figures of ULMWP, Benny Wenda. Benny Wenda is the Interim President of the ULMWP Provisional Government, founder of the Free West Papua Campaign, and West Papua independence leader (Wenda, 2022). To provide information to international society, Benny Wenda uses the Twitter platform with 58,000 followers and 2,203 followings as of April 2010 (Wenda, 2022).



Figure 4 The @BennyWenda's Tweet (Wenda, 2020).

The Twitter account @BennyWenda tends to get more attention from the wider international society. This can be seen in an example Tweet in **Figure 4**, where Benny Wenda uploaded a video inviting the audience to support the Free West Papua campaign. In this 1 minute 14 second video, Benny Wenda shares his life story of wanting the people of West Papua to be "free" from the power of the Indonesian government by seeking support from the international society. The video has been watched by 44,400 viewers from all over the world, with 324 Retweets, 83 Quote Tweets, and 867 Likes. This video also received many positive and negative comments from the Indonesian people and the international society. Some audiences support the independence of West Papua, on the other hand, there are also those who oppose the separation of Papua from Indonesia. Again and again, Benny Wenda is constantly trying to influence the opinion of the international society in this Twitter account (at **Figure 5**) to achieve the goal of being free from Indonesia.




Figure 5 The @BennyWenda's Tweet (Wenda, 2020).

Another example is in one of the uploads, Benny Wenda is seen promoting the ULMWP website on his personal Twitter account (**Figure 6**). In his Tweet, Benny Wenda invites elected Government representatives from foreign countries to support the call for an internationally supervised vote on self-determination for the people of West Papua by filling out the form on the website.



Figure 6 The @BennyWenda's Tweet (Wenda, 2020).

Moreover, one of his Tweets (can be seen in **Figure 7**) also seems to ask for a visit from an international organization, namely the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), to respond to the bombings of houses of worship and murders that occurred in West Papua which were allegedly carried out by the Indonesian military. That Tweet upload states that *"From April-July 2021, 11 people were shot in the Ilaga region & 9 churches destroyed by the Indonesian military..."*. Meanwhile, the Indonesian government stated in several national news that the shooting incident was carried out by the Armed Criminal Group (KKB) or a group with the same goals as the ULMWP. The shooting incident carried out by KKB was recorded at least four times (CNN Indonesia Staff, 2021). This information was delivered directly by the Indonesian National Police in Papua. This incident claimed the lives of civilians and members of the Indonesian police and army who were serving in the area. Based on the Patrol News Journal, this shooting incident also claimed more civilian casualties than reported on the Twitter account @BennyWenda (Putra, 2021). Also, so far, there have been no other official reports regarding the bombings of houses of worship launched by the Indonesian government.



Figure 7 The @BennyWenda's Tweet (Wenda, 2021).

- @VictorcMambor's Twitter Account

Victor Mambor is a journalist from Papua who is also the General Leader of the Jubi Papua news media and the national board of the Alliance Journalists Independent (AJI). Victor Mambor is a Papuan journalist who claims to be dedicated to reporting about the issue in West Papua in the name of journalism. Victor Mambor also uses one digital social media platform, Twitter at @VictorcMambor, to share more voices from Papua. This Twitter account started in May 2009, and until now, there are 578 following and 36,800 followers so far (Mambor, 2022). However, this paper's author found several controversial claims in his tweets.

His Twitter account often contains reports or statements from the ULMWP and special discussions about the problems faced by minorities and indigenous people in West Papua, which are rarely raised by the national media due to excessive attention to the capital's elite. This led to public opinion that Victor Mambor contained pro-separatist coverage. However, this was denied by Victor Mambor because on his Twitter account, he also often mentions several reports about the activities of the Indonesian government. One form of reporting can be seen in **Figure 8**, which contains Victor's response to a related news story about the Indonesian government, which is considered not committed to resolving the conflict in Papua. The news was delivered by the Spokesperson for the Papua Peace Network (JDP), Yan Cristian Warinussy, and published by the Jubi Papua news media

in September 2022. In this news article, Warinussy comments on several visits by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, to Papua, which is considered ceremonial and does not prioritize or attach importance to resolving conflicts that occur in Papua. Hence, this news is directed to President Jokowi to immediately take the first step in resolving the conflict in Papua by not neglecting the settlement of alleged gross human rights violations in Papua and starting a peace-building dialogue with all parties, both at home and abroad.




Figure 8 The @VictorcMambor's Tweet (Mambor, 2022).

In this Twitter account, it was also found that Victor Mambor was active in calling out some news that was considered not in accordance with reality. This can be seen in **Figure 9**, where Victor Mambor mentions that the Apache AH-64E combat helicopter has been identified in a shooting attack in the highlands of West Papua. He claimed Indonesian soldiers fired machine guns inside the aircraft toward residents, homes, and agricultural areas. The link embedded in the Tweet explains that the Indonesian government ordered these 8 Apache helicopters and other military equipment in 2012 for USD 1.4 Billion in a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deal with the United States Military. Meanwhile, the mass media reported the opposite. The Indonesian government indeed purchased these eight Apache AH-64E combat helicopters. Still, according to FMS's request, these vehicles will be used to maintain Indonesia's defense in the border area and will be stationed in the Natuna Islands. This includes assisting the Indonesian military in carrying out counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations in Indonesia's border areas with foreign countries and

controlling the free flow of shipping through the Malacca Strait (Yeo, 2017). Another thing is that the operating base for the eight Apache helicopters is currently located at Squadron 11/Assault, Ahmad Yani Army Air Base Semarang, Central Java (Tempo Staff, 2018). Thus, this is considered impossible because the distance that this vehicle can achieve is 300 miles while the distance between the location of the Ahmad Yani Air Base in Semarang to the attack point in the highlands of West Papua is more than 2,500 miles (Boeing Defense Staff, 2022). So, the news that Victor Mambor stated was inconsistent with the facts described previously, which could be judged to be deceiving or telling lies to the international society regarding events that occurred in West Papua.



Figure 9 The @VictorcMambor's Tweet (Mambor, 2022).

In addition, in his Tweet posting, as shown in Figure 10, Victor Mambor revealed that the enforcement of human rights in Papua province, considered increasingly alarming, has succeeded in attracting international concern. One of the concrete examples of evidence is that in December 2020, the United Nations Human Rights Commission, through the Special Procedures Mandate Holders (SPMH), highlighted and asked for clarification and explanation from the Indonesian government regarding several cases of alleged human rights violations in Papua. These include killing children, enforced disappearances, excessive use of force, and the forcible transfer of persons and indications of neglect (CNN Indonesia, 2022). The UN Human Rights Commission also urges the Indonesian government to create a "meaningful and inclusive" dialogue space with the Papuan people to address the various economic, social, and political issues they face. In response to this, the Indonesian government, as the competent authority, claims that it has paid attention to human rights

issues in Papua and West Papua which is stated in Presidential Instruction No. 9/2020 concerning the Acceleration of Welfare Development in Papua and West Papua Provinces (BBC News Indonesia Staff, 2020). In this Presidential Instruction, it is stated that there are steps that the government should take in dealing with human rights issues, including opening a space for dialogue. However, the agendas of the handling process related to human rights issues in Papua are said to have been hampered due to the pandemic that occurred in the Covid-19 era (BBC News Indonesia Staff, 2020). With this, it was found that the response from the Indonesian government was considered unreasonable because cases of human rights issues in Papua and West Papua had existed before the pandemic. Therefore, this call from the United Nations can certainly be an impetus for the Indonesian government to focus more on handling and improving humanitarian conditions in Papua, both economically, socially, and politically.



Figure 10 The @VictorcMambor's Tweet (Mambor, 2022).

Analysis of Digital Diplomacy in The Case of ULMWP

After the discussion above, we can now analyze the phenomenon in this study case using the theory advocated by Todorovska (2015) on how a separatist movement utilizes a digital platform for public diplomacy to support their cause. This research has discovered the ULMWP's digital diplomacy, as the matrix illustrates below.




Figure 11 The matrix of the problem identification of this research is created by the author.

The frameworks describe the phenomenon of a non-state actor, the ULMWP, that utilizes digital platforms (digital diplomacy) to achieve its goal of bringing full sovereignty of West Papua from Indonesia through a non-violent method by rallying political support from the international society.

The previous discussion of the utilization of digital domains by ULMWP in the form of a website and Twitter accounts such as Free West Papua, Benny Wenda, and Victor Mambor accounts. The previous section of this paper has shown some examples of tweets by those three Twitter accounts that contain narration and messages with the tone of supporting the secession of West Papua. The number of influences that those tweets are given substantial towards shaping the international society perspective towards the issue, which then could determine the amount of political support for the secession of West Papua from Indonesia.

It is now can be concluded that the action done by some of the samples of the Twitter accounts which this paper analyze is to try to spread its message to internationalize the issue of West Papua to raise the international society's awareness of this issue with the end goal of gaining diplomatic or political support for the secession which can be observed from the Westminster Declaration (**Appendix A**). It can be seen where many influential politicians from various countries, such as the Prime Minister of Tonga, several Ministers of Vanuatu, the Prime Minister of Solomon Islands, and even some Parliament members of Australia and the United Kingdom, which listed as the signatory of the declaration to support the secession for West Papua. It then validated the phenomenon where a secession movement tried to engage in the international society through the digital platforms as a method to achieve their goal, as Todorovska (2015)

explained. Finally, we can conclude that the ULMWP did engage in international society through the digital platforms mentioned earlier to rally political support for the secession of West Papua.

Conclusion

The digital platform saw an increase in its usage in the past few years, ranging from individuals, the government, and various organizations and mass movements around the globe to achieve their interest. Many studies have been dedicated to explain the phenomenon of when digital platforms are used for diplomacy, by state and non-state actors, which has also been explored in this paper. As has been discussed above, the utilization of diplomacy is not all about state actors. Yet, non-state actors like secessionist or separatist groups can also use diplomacy to rally international society to achieve their goals. The study case of this research where a secessionist movement named the ULMWP utilized digital platforms to internationalize the issue. This research has discovered that the ULMWP established a website domain and utilized Twitter to internationalize the issue to gain more political and diplomatic support from countries around the globe. On the official ULMWP website, it has been proven that they seek political support by inviting government representatives from foreign countries to support their declaration of aspirations for self-determination. Likewise, the Twitter accounts @FreeWestPapua, @BennyWenda, and @VictorcMambor, share or call for their messages regarding issues happening in Papua and West Papua to influence international society opinion. It has been proven that their messages have received responses from various circles of international and even domestic society, both positive and negative reactions.

With the discovery discussed in this research, it can be concluded that the ULMWP, as a secessionist movement, utilize digital platforms to achieve its goal of seceding from Indonesia by trying to internationalize the issue and rallying diplomatic support for the movement's cause. Further studies could examine how significant the effort of using the digital platform as a tool for public diplomacy is beneficial for the group's cause.

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