Turkey’s Engagement in The Conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh
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ABSTRACT
The background to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the struggle for the territory between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Because internationally the area is recognized as belonging to Azerbaijan, even though the majority of the population is the Armenian diaspora. This issue is considered important because the area is quite strategic internationally and involves many actors. In conducting this research, the researcher uses the concept of National Interest and Foreign Policy. This research was conducted to find out why Turkey was involved in this conflict. Where with the two concepts used in this study, the results found the fact that Turkey’s involvement there was caused by many things such as; Due to the common religion of the majority of Azerbaijanis and Turks, in order to secure energy supplies from Azerbaijan to Turkey, arms sales which will certainly become national income for Turkey, minimize Russia’s influence in the region, and strengthen Turkey’s influence in the South Caucasus and the international community, normalize relations with Russia, building good relations with neighboring countries, strengthens Azerbaijan’s military in addition to its main goal of helping Azerbaijan crush the separatist group in Nagorno-Karabakh who wants to break away from Azerbaijan.
Keywords: Bilateral Relations, Engagement, National Interest.
INTRODUCTION

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was motivated by the presence of Armenians who fled the genocide carried out by the troops of the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) to the Russian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh region. When it was still under the influence of the Soviet Union, the Nagorno-Karabakh region was part of the Azerbaijan Province in accordance with the terms of the agreement between Turkey and Armenia. However, later, the council of Nagorno-Karabakh declared to join Armenia because of the religious similarity between the majority of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, even though legally the territory was still part of Azerbaijan. Due to the similarity of religion shared by ethnic Turks and Transcaucasian Muslims (future Azerbaijanis), Armenian survivors of the genocide tend not to discriminate between Transcaucasian Muslims and ethnic Turks. This tendency is reinforced by the fact that the Azerbaijani ethnic leaders consider themselves to be Turks. After Armenia and Azerbaijan declared their independence due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, international recognition that the Nagorno-Karabakh region was part of Azerbaijan further exacerbated the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan because the region was inhabited by the majority of the Armenian diaspora (Hidayati, 2020).

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Meanwhile, the author has a tentative hypothesis that Turkey’s involvement in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was caused by Turkey’s foreign policy designed by Turkey’s first president, Mustofa Kemal Ataturk. “Peace at home, peace abroad.” According to Mustofa Kemal Ataturk, the use of this formula is in accordance with the wishes and longings of the Turkish people for justice and peace in a world governed by consistent legal principles (Erkin, 1952). Therefore, in this conflict, Turkey seeks to create peace and security in the environment around its country in accordance with applicable international law and also fulfills Turkey’s foreign policy ambitions to achieve the national interest of the Turkish state, “Peace at home,
peace abroad," as a foothold for Turkey's foreign policy. Along with this foreign policy, Turkey wants to achieve peace and security in the region around its country. Some of the ambitions of Turkey for its involvement in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh are the interests to ensure the supply of energy in the form of natural gas and oil sent from Azerbaijan to Turkey is always under control. On the other hand, the author is of the view that religious factors also have a considerable influence on Turkey’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, because Turkey under Erdogan's leadership tends to be so Islamist in its policy direction.

The purpose of this study is to find out why Turkey is motivated to get involved in the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh.

To better understand Turkey's motivation in its involvement in the conflict that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh, the author uses the concept of National Interest and Foreign Policy. The concept of the National Interest that the author uses is according to Hans J. Morgenthau. National interest according to J. Hans Morgenthau is the perceived needs and desire of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment. Hans J. Morgenthau divides the national interest according to its urgency into two levels: vital (primary) and secondary. The vital or primary level cannot be contested or compromised, usually involving the physical existence, fundamental or cultural values of a country. The secondary level is a negotiable interest, usually, it falls outside the first category. In addition, Morgenthau also divides between temporary and permanent interests, special and general interests, and complementary and conflicting interests. Permanent interests are interests that are constant over a long period of time. Temporary interests are interests owned by the state at a certain time. Public interest is the interest of the state for a wide geographical area or many fields. Special interest is defined closely in time or space and is often a logical result of public interest (Marleku, 2013).

Then for foreign policy, the author uses the perspective of K. J. Holsti as a foothold, because Holsti is classified as a realist successor to Morgenthau. Holsti is of the view that Foreign Policy is a policy taken by the government of a country or other political community in relation to states and non-state actors in the international community. According to K. J. Holsti, foreign policy has four main components, including: foreign policy orientations, national roles, goals, and actions (Hara, 2011).

Furthermore, to conduct this research, the author uses a country-level analysis. So the author will see Turkey's steps as a unified whole, not focusing on individual actors who lead the country (Mas'oed, 1990). The reason the author chooses to use this level of analysis is that Turkey's involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has long been carried out with more than one era of government.

**METHOD**
As for the method in this study, the authors tend to choose to use qualitative methods. Where the qualitative method is a process of research and understanding based on methods to examine a social phenomenon and human problems. In this study, the author makes a complex picture, examines the power of words, detailed reports from related news sources, and conducts studies from the views of the parties concerned (Iskandar, 2009). Because the author feels that in this conflict there are more descriptions through explanations that indicate the power of words, as well as the views of various parties involved in this conflict, both from the Azerbaijani side, the Armenian side, the Turkish side, and the Russian side.

The data sources used are secondary data sources scattered on the internet, in the form of news, journals, and books. The data collection technique used by the author in this study is a documentation technique, where this technique is a technique of collecting data from existing document sources. Information can be obtained from facts that are conveyed in letter, daily notes, photo archives, minutes of meeting, souvenirs, activity journals, and so on (Rahardjo, 2011). Meanwhile, the analysis technique used by the author in this research was content analysis technique, which is a part of qualitative data analysis techniques. This analysis technique is also called content analysis, which can be interpreted as a research with in-depth discussion on a written or printed information found on mass media. This technique was introduced by Harold D. Lasswell, who was the pioneer of coding symbol technique, which is often understood as the recording of symbols or messages systematically, which is then interpreted or provided with further explanation (Hayati, 2019).

RESULT

Turkey’s Engagement: At A Glance

According to Bayram Balci, at the end of the Soviet era, the Caucasus and Central Asia became important locations for Turkey in making its foreign policy. However, because Turkey’s ambitions have exceeded its actual capacity to act, Turkey has returned to its original style of conducting foreign policy, more pragmatic and realistic. In addition, Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s diplomatic initiatives have made the Caucasus the main focus for improving Turkey’s relations with its surroundings, especially Armenia. Normalization of relations with the Caucasus countries remains one of Turkey’s priorities, not only for economic reasons but also for political and diplomatic reasons because Turkey wants to appear as a country at peace with its neighbors, which is in accordance with its foreign policy of “Peace at home, peace abroad.” (Balci, 2014).

Then Daria Isachenko argued that by siding with Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey was essentially pursuing its goal of weakening the status quo of the region. Above all, Turkey aims to gain a place at the negotiating table where Russia will be the negotiator for resolving the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the future without including Western actors. Turkey’s plans are not unattractive to Russia, but because of the complicated relationship between Turkey and Armenia, there is a risk that
Armenia and Turkey will be the opponents in this conflict instead of Armenia and Azerbaijan (Isachenko, 2020).

In addition to obtaining energy supplies and gaining a place at the negotiating table that may occur between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the author also looks at the influence of religious issues in this conflict a little. This is based on religious similarity, that the majority of the population of Azerbaijan and Turkey are both Muslim (World Population Review, 2020), in contrast to Armenia, where the majority of the population recognizes Christianity (World Population Review, 2020). Coupled with the policies of Turkey under Erdogan, which currently seems inclined to Islam.

The Dynamics of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

In this section, the author will explain how the dynamics of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh went. The dynamics of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh are actually influenced by the roots of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in maintaining their ownership of the region. The involvement of Turkey and Russia also colored the invigorates the conflict with their own interests because these two countries are indeed geographically close with the conflict area.

The root cause of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is due to the different perspectives of Azerbaijan and Armenia regarding the ownership status of the territory. Since the declaration of independence from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia at the end of May 1918 the territory now understood as Nagorno-Karabakh when it was still part of the Russian Empire Elisabethpol Province, together with Baku Province merged to form Azerbaijan, according to the territorial agreement agreed between Armenia and Turkey during World War 1, although Turkey was still having war against the Soviet Union at that time. Due to the territorial agreement between Armenia and Turkey, Nagorno-Karabakh was then internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan (Hidayati, 2020). In 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh’s legislation issued a resolution to join Armenia although the legal territory was in Azerbaijan territory (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021). Azerbaijan attempted to suppress that the Nagorno-Karabakh’s separatist group movement, however, Armenia supported them instead. This is what caused a clash between Armenian and Azerbaijan ethnicities, and as soon as the Soviet Union was dissolved, the ethnic conflict turned into a full-scale war (BBC, 2020).

As for the latest escalation, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was caused by the prime minister of Armenia who has served since 2018, Nikol Pashinyan stated, “Karabakh is Armenia.” (Hidayati, 2020) which of course contradicts the international recognition of the ownership of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. As stated by Husnan Bey Fananie, former Ambassador of Indonesia for Azerbaijan, that Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally acknowledged as part of Azerbaijan (Kurnia, 2020). Supported by the available facts, Nagorno-Karabakh in 1989 was Artsakh special autonomous region under the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia. This is what made Armenia wants to maintain Nagorno-Karabakh as part of its country (Gahramanova, 2006), although it means that Armenia supported Nagorno-Karabakh ethnopolitical conflict
to separate itself from Azerbaijan and challenged the international recognition that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan. Therefore, Turkey would be on Azerbaijan’s side to be against Armenia from doing such thing under various backgrounds and interests. Moreover, Turkey is the first state which recognized Azerbaijan’s independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union into independence states.

DISCUSSION

Turkey’s Engagement and Its Interest

After discussing the dynamics of the conflict that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh, the author will explain about Turkey’s involvement and interests based on the variables that exist in the national interest concept according to Hans J. Morgenthau as well as based on the main components in the foreign policy concept according to K. J. Holsti.

A. According to The Urgency

Vital. According to its urgency in the national interest, the author views that the vital reason for Turkey’s involvement in the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh foreign policy is the religious similarity of the majority of the population of Turkey and Azerbaijan. Because according to data compiled by worldpopulationreview.com, Turkey and Azerbaijan are two countries where the majority of the population is Muslim. Muslims in Azerbaijan alone constitute 96.9% of the total population. Meanwhile, Turkey has a Muslim population of 99.2% of the total population (World Population Review, 2020). In contrast to Armenia, where 93% of the population adheres to Christianity (World Population Review, 2020). Although Azerbaijan is predominantly Shia and the Turkic people are Sunni, in some other parts of the world conflicts often occur between the two groups, such as what happened in Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. This is reinforced by evidence that Turkey’s behavior under the Erdogan government is indeed very inclined to Islam. Moreover, Erdogan has the belief that "Islam is the solution" (Al-Islam huwa Al-Hall). Even Erdogan was able to make Turkey bounce back from the nickname "The Sick Man in Europe" to become a strong and growing country, even counted as a country that can contribute to creating peace (Junaidi, 2016). The author is of the view that Islam is a fundamental value for Turkey because religion will lead its adherents to have a culture. Where culture is a fundamental value for a country according to Hans Morgenthau (Marleku, 2013). In the end, due to the similarity of the religion of the majority population of Azerbaijan and Turkey, the purpose of this foreign policy action is to create a unified Muslim community under Turkish control as happened when Turkey was still a sultanate, with Turkey’s national role as the leader of Muslim countries in the world.

Secondary. Still on the side of the urgency, the secondary factor of Turkey’s involvement as a country is securing the energy supply that Turkey imports from Azerbaijan. At first, in terms of energy Turkey had a dependence on natural gas from Russia because of the agreement that had been agreed between Russia and Turkey. The agreement requires Turkey to buy gas from Russia for up to 25 years, from 1998 to 2022 via the Trans-Balkan pipeline (Gazprom Export, 2020). However, since the contract will expire in 2022,
Turkey is trying to eliminate its dependence on natural gas to Russia by buying natural gas from Azerbaijan which tends to be cheaper (Irawan, 2019).

Since Azerbaijan is now the main supplier of natural gas to Turkey, one of the goals of Turkey’s foreign policy is for the flow of gas from Azerbaijan to be unimpeded and wants to demonstrate that it will maintain the energy supply chain politically and even if necessary through the use of limited military force. This is evidenced by the actions of Turkey’s foreign policy that was involved in the battle that took place in July 2020 between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Tovuz district, an area quite far from Nagorno-Karabakh which is usually the center of large-scale battles (Avdaliani, 2020), because Tovuz is an area traversed by three important and interconnected natural gas pipelines, the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). If the safety of the pipeline is threatened, the supply of natural gas as energy from Azerbaijan to Turkey will also be disrupted (Guler, 2020). The three natural gas pipelines are better known as the Southern Gas Corridor. While TANAP is a pipeline that supplies Turkey’s gas needs from Azerbaijan, the 1,850 km long pipeline is the largest part of the Southern Gas Corridor, which spans 3,500 km and was inaugurated on 29 May 2020 in Baku (Temizer & Erdogan, 2018). Therefore, like it or not, Turkey must participate in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh by defending Azerbaijan. Turkey wants to ensure energy supplies from Azerbaijan are always in a safe condition.

Although the discovery of Turkey’s natural gas resources in the Black Sea is one of the important steps that are likely to reduce Turkey’s annual gas import bill by twelve billion USD and will change the dynamics of the region (Kaya & Yuksel, 2020) or even be able to make Turkey independent in terms of energy. So that in the future Turkey will no longer need energy supplies in the form of natural gas or oil, either from Russia or from Azerbaijan.

From natural gas mines in Azerbaijan, it turns out that Azerbaijan has proven reserves of 1,146 bcm (Billion Cubic Meters). For annual consumption of natural gas, Turkey imports from Azerbaijan 12.8 bcm (Hikmata & Muhamad, 2019). Turkey’s annual natural gas consumption was reported at 4,182 Cub ft/Day bn (Billion Cubic Feet Per Day) in 2019. This record is down from the previous 4,570 Cub ft/Day bn for 2018. Turkey’s natural gas consumption data is updated annually, with an average of 1,415 Cub ft/Day bn from 1982 to 2019, with 38 observations. From data collected by ceicdata.com, the highest annual natural gas consumption in Turkey reached 4,989 Cub ft/Day bn in 2017, while the lowest was 0.003 Cub ft/Day bn in 1982 (CEIC Data, 2021). The data shows that Turkey has a very large natural gas demand, which of course makes Turkey dependent on Azerbaijan’s natural gas reserves. The author argues that Turkey’s dependence on energy imported from Azerbaijan is the goal of Turkey’s foreign policy which according to the concept of national interest is secondary, because when energy from Azerbaijan is cut off, Turkey can actually buy and get supplies from other countries to meet its energy needs.

B. According to The Duration
Temporary. According to the author, Turkey’s national interest according to its temporary duration in its involvement in the conflict that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh is to obtain national income from Turkey’s exports to Azerbaijan, especially in the export of military equipment. Referring to data compiled by TIM (Turkish Exporters Assembly), an institution that groups more than 95,000 exporting companies in 61 sectors, it shows that Azerbaijan has increased six times the purchase of defense equipment and aviation to Turkey from the previous year worth one hundred and twenty-three million USD in the first nine months of 2020. The majority of purchases are in the form of drones, rocket launchers, ammunition, and other weapons. In fact, the number of military exports from Turkey to Azerbaijan almost reached two hundred and fifty-six million USD in the first 11 months of 2020 (Spicer, 2020).

*Arms sales data from Turkey to Azerbaijan (Thousand USD) (Spicer, 2020).

Turkey’s national interest which is also temporary is to strengthen Azerbaijan’s military and crush separatism there. Although there are accusations from the Armenian side that Turkey’s involvement in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is just another front in the same hybrid war that is taking place in Syria and Libya (Hidayati, 2020). This is also in line with the view of Armenia which accuses Turkey of mobilizing Syrian mercenaries to fight alongside the Azerbaijani army (Broers, 2020). Despite this Armenian accusation that Turkey mobilized Syrian mercenaries was finally denied by Turkey and Azerbaijan (Staff, 2020). In actuality, since 1992, Turkey has taken foreign policy actions with Azerbaijan ratifying the agreement to provide training to the Azerbaijani armed forces. Turkey has been providing training to Azerbaijani troops since 1992. Under the agreement, cadets, junior officers, and mid-level command staff of the Azerbaijani armed forces will receive education at the Turkish Military Academy, Turkish War Academy, Gülhane Military Medical Academy, and non-commissioned schools. The process started with Azerbaijan sending its soldiers to attend training and education in Turkey, which slowly then transferred education and training to Azerbaijan
This training of the Azerbaijani armed forces by Turkey is carried out with the aim of strengthening the Azerbaijani armed forces, especially in countering the separatist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh which is supported by Armenia.

Initially, Turkey’s interest in helping to strengthen the Azerbaijani military was to send Azerbaijani troops to be trained in Turkey. But then gradually the strategy was changed by the way Turkish military officials came to Azerbaijan to train Azerbaijani troops there. The real action of providing training by Turkish military officials to the Azerbaijani military was seen when July 1, 2020, Turkish F-16 fighter jets arrived in Azerbaijan to conduct joint military exercises. Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense said the jets will be included in the Joint Exercise Tour Az Qartali-2020 which will start on August 5, 2020. The exercise also involves helicopters and the jets will continue in the Azerbaijani capital, Baku then Nakhchivan, Ganja, Kurdamir, and Yevlakh cities until 10 August 2020. From 1 to 5 August 2020 the exercises focused solely on ground exercises in Baku and Nakhchivan using simulated artillery, armored vehicles, and mortars to attack targets (Anadolu, 2020). This was done by Turkey to make Azerbaijan more visible that Turkey really supports Azerbaijan in the conflict that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh.

In terms of strengthening Azerbaijan’s defenses to compete with the Armenian military in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it is known that Azerbaijan became an importer country from Turkey’s defense and aviation industry in September 2020 by spending around 77.1 million USD or equivalent to 608.5 million Lira which followed by Oman with 62.9 million USD, the United States with 62.7 million USD, India with 15.6 million USD, and Germany with 14.5 million USD (Daily Sabah, 2020). According to data compiled by TIM (Turkish Exporters Assembly) in 2020, Turkey’s exports to Azerbaijan in October touched 101.209 million USD and in November decreased by 69% to only 31,415 million USD (Sunnetci, 2020). Of course, Turkey’s export of defense equipment to Azerbaijan will become Turkey’s national income, which of course will increase Turkey’s economic strength in the eyes of the international community.

In the conflict that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the role of Turkish-made weapons was so great that it strengthened the Azerbaijani military to repulse the Armenian military. In addition to placing several F-16 fighter jets in Azerbaijan as Armenia military deterrent force (Spicer, 2020), the supports weapons produced by the Turkish defense and aviation industry such as the BAYRAKTAR TB2-S A-UAV, MAM-L, and MAM-C Smart Munitions, Laser Guidance Kits, and artillery rockets to offset the military power of Armenia (Sunnetci, 2020).

Behind all the military aid and ambitions of exporting military equipment from Turkey to Azerbaijan aimed at winning the escalation against Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh, there is the view of an analyst from the Center for Security Policy, based in Washington DC as well as MA candidate for Counterterrorism from IDC Herzliya in Israel, Maya Carlin, that Turkey’s behavior will actually increase the length of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (Ramadhan, 2020). Because the existing data shows that Azerbaijan’s purchase of
weapons from Turkey, during the latest escalation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, has really skyrocketed.

Turkey’s national income from exporting military equipment, strengthening Azerbaijan’s military, and quelling separatism are temporary because when the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is over, the export of Turkish military equipment to Azerbaijan will also stop, when the Azerbaijani military is strong, there is no need for further training, and when separatism has been destroyed then Turkey will not send troops for assistance to the Azerbaijani military.

**Permanent.** According to the duration of time, the permanent national interest of Turkey’s involvement in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is to build good relations with its neighbors, especially Azerbaijan. This was successfully done by Turkey with a statement from Azerbaijan, that Azerbaijan considers Turkey a “true friend and brother” (Aliyev, 2020) or as “two countries, one nation” (Avundukluoglu, 2020). Along with good relations from neighboring countries, the orientation of Turkey’s foreign policy is the formation of regional alliances so that when Turkey gets an attack from outside, Azerbaijan will immediately help Turkey. In addition, the escalation of conflict with neighboring countries will reduce or even lose the sense of security possessed by residents of a country, especially residents in border areas.

**C. According to The Specifications**

**Specific.** According to the specifics, Turkey’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has a special reason, namely to get income from the sale of Turkish military equipment to Azerbaijan (Spicer, 2020), Turkey’s foreign policy actions help Azerbaijan strengthen its military to balance the Armenian military, and help Azerbaijan crush separatism. Actually, some national interests that are special according to their specifications, can also be included in other variables. Like the national income that Turkey gets from exports to Azerbaijan, it can be included as a temporary national interest according to its duration. Likewise, strengthening the Azerbaijani military and eradicating separatism which is included in the special national interest according to its specifications, can also be considered as a temporary national interest according to its duration. Other national interests may also be like the two national interests.

**General.** In reality, Turkey’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has a general national interest according to its specifications, namely expanding its influence in the South Caucasus region, even internationally. This can be seen, one of which is the emergence of accusations from Erdogan that were raised at a rally conducted by the AK Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or Justice and Development Party) to the leaders of the OSCE Minsk Group (United States, France, and Russia) that they had provided full assistance to the Armenian side in the form of weapons (Stamboltsian & Sargsian, 2020). In addition, Erdogan also accused the leaders of the OSCE Minsk Group that they were only buying time to quickly
resolve the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Erdogan stressed that the Minsk OSCE leaders only needed to immediately hand over the disputed land (Nagorno-Karabakh) to its owner (Azerbaijan) (Staff, 2020) so that the conflict would be over soon. According to the author, with the accusations made by Erdogan, it appears that Turkey wants to show its power and influence in the South Caucasus region or even in the international forum.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s efforts to minimize Russia’s influence in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are not that big since Russia has fairly good bilateral relations with Turkey. Even in May 2020, Russia and Turkey held a video conference to discuss cooperation in various fields in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic that was engulfing the international community (Bicer, 2020). Although Russia has a special relationship with Armenia in the military field as part of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), Russia emphasized that the CSTO agreement does not apply to conflicts that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh, because Nagorno-Karabakh is still a disputed area by Armenia and Azerbaijan, but is internationally recognized as part of Baku (Maulana, 2020). Supported by historical facts, that Turkey was the first country to recognize independence for Azerbaijan in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as statements by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, he has often emphasized that Turkey will always be behind Azerbaijan (Lisbet, 2020). On the other hand, Russia does not have the right to interfere in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Coupled with the statement from the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, that Russia is bound by a defense pact agreement with Armenia, but has absolutely nothing to do with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the territory of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenian separatists (Suhartono, 2020).

Turkey’s behavior in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh shows that Turkey seems to want to further assert its influence in the South Caucasus region. Evidenced by the Turkish army’s strong support for Azerbaijani troops is an important factor in the conflict, according to analysts. The growing support of the Turkish army for Azerbaijan in the face of Armenia is part of Turkey’s efforts to project its influence in the region (VOA, 2020). By increasing its influence in the South Caucasus region, especially Azerbaijan, Turkey will automatically show the international world its military power. Moreover, the authorities in Turkey say the country has become the world’s fourth-largest producer of military drones since Erdogan increased production of the domestic defense and aviation industries to reduce weapons dependence on the West (Spicer, 2020).

After the escalation that took place in Nagorno-Karabakh ended with a ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Turkish Parliament allowed President Erdogan to send peacekeepers to Azerbaijan in order to monitor the ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia aimed at ending the conflict in the region (France 24, 2020). Although there is no immediate agreement on how many troops will be sent there. But, of course, it further strengthens the notion that Turkey wants to increase its influence in the South Caucasus region, and even internationally. Because so far Turkey has sent so many peacekeepers
to areas prone to conflict, either in the Middle East or in Africa, even this has been done by Turkey for a long time (Aini, 2020). These foreign policy actions show that in general Turkey’s interest in its involvement in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh aims to enlarge its national role and influence in the South Caucasus region and even internationally.

On the other hand, the writer thinks that whatever Turkey did to Azerbaijan was indeed an attempt to minimize Russia’s influence in the conflict that took place in Nagorno-Karabakh. Both the import of natural gas by Turkey from Azerbaijan, the export of military equipment to Azerbaijan, joint military exercises, military advice provided. Because with all these things, Azerbaijan will certainly have more confidence in Turkey. Even Azerbaijan considers Turkey a “true friend and brother” (Aliyev, 2020) or as “two countries, one nation” (Avundukluoglu, 2020). In addition, after the last escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh ended, Turkey still wanted to reduce Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus region by also sending peacekeepers to the borders of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

D. According to The Compatibility

Complement Each Other. Turkey’s national interest in its involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict based on its compatibility with complementary variables is the normalization of relations with Russia. Even though relations between Turkey and Russia are often heated, this has even happened since Russia was still an empire and Turkey was still a sultanate, which continues to this day, where Russia and Turkey are conducting proxy wars in the Middle East and Africa. The author views that the purpose of Turkey’s foreign policy to normalize relations with Russia is because there are actually quite good relations between Russia and Turkey (Hidayati, 2020), especially since Turkey has had energy dependence on Russia (Gazprom Export, 2020) as well as the role of Russia, which is also one of the main arms suppliers for Azerbaijan (Yalcinkaya, 2021). Efforts to normalize relations between Russia and Turkey were seen when the conflict reached a peace agreement at the end of 2020, Russia and Turkey both sent peacekeepers to Azerbaijan to monitor the ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia aimed at ending the conflict in the region (France 24, 2020).

Contradicting Each Other. It is still in Turkey’s national interest in its involvement in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh based on its compatibility but with conflicting variables is the goal of Turkey’s foreign policy to normalize relations with Armenia. The author argues that normalizing relations with Turkey and Armenia is contradictory because Turkey actually has a foreign policy of “Peace at home, peace abroad” (Erkin, 1952), but on the other hand, Turkey is on the side of Azerbaijan in this conflict because of a statement from Nikol Pashinyan that “Karabakh is Armenian,” (Hidayati, 2020) which contradicts the international recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh region that it is part of Azerbaijan. Because Armenia still refers to territorial boundaries when the Armenian USSR had not yet broken up, where Nagorno-Karabakh in 1989 was a special autonomous region of Artsakh under the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (Gahramanova,
2006), also because of religious differences held by the majority of the Turkish population and Armenia, as well as the conflict between Armenia and Turkey that has occurred since World War I (Hidayati, 2020).

CONCLUSION

The conclusion obtained by the author in the study of Turkey's involvement in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh used a qualitative descriptive analysis method with secondary data obtained by the author from sources scattered on the internet, in the form of journals, news, websites, statements from the actors involved. In this conflict, along with the documentation data collection technique, as well as the data analysis technique as content analysis and uses the concept of national interest and also the concept of foreign policy, it can be said that in this conflict that has occurred for more than a hundred years, there is a strong correlation between the concept of national interest and the concept of foreign policy on the grounds of Turkey's involvement and interests in the conflict that occurred there.

Turkey's foreign policy actions in its involvement in the conflict that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh did indeed have goals, roles, and orientations that were in accordance with the concept of foreign policy that had been described by K. J. Holsti. These actions are in the form of providing troops assistance, military training for the Azerbaijani armed forces, or other actions.

Furthermore, the author also finds a suitable correlation between the actions taken by Turkey in its involvement in the conflict that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh with the concept of national interest described by Hans J. Morgenthau, both according to its urgency; vital or secondary, with the duration of time; temporary or permanent, to the specifications; specific or general, as well as with their compatibility; complement or contradict each other.

Turkey's actions in the conflict that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh are in accordance with the urgency, with a vital variable is the factor of religious similarity adopted by the majority of the population of Turkey and Azerbaijan, due to the similarity of religion will emerge cultural similarities, especially Turkey's steps under Erdogan are seen so put forward the religious factor. The secondary variable is the act of protecting the energy supply pipeline sent from Azerbaijan to Turkey, even Turkey has deployed its troops to protect it. Then according to the temporary duration, it is to get national income from arms sales from Turkey to Azerbaijan, because it will stop when the conflict there is over. Meanwhile, what is permanent is to build good relations with neighboring Turkey, especially in this conflict, Azerbaijan. Furthermore, according to its specific specifications, Turkey's efforts to help Azerbaijan crush the separatism that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh and also strengthen Azerbaijan's military to balance the military power possessed by Armenia. For a general nature is Turkey's efforts to increase its influence in the South Caucasus region. The
last thing is that in accordance with its complementary compatibility, Turkey's efforts to normalize relations with Russia, which had heated up and were tense due to several things, such as proxy wars in the Middle East and Africa. While the contradicting variable is the normalization of the relationship between Turkey and Armenia. Since, on the one hand, Turkey has a foreign policy of “Peace at home, Peace abroad,” while on the other hand in this conflict Turkey is on the side of Azerbaijan which of course is against Armenia because Armenia supports the separatism of the Republic of Artsakh located in Nagorno-Karabakh who wants to release themselves from Azerbaijan.
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