THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNION OF EUROPEAN FOOTBALL ASSOCIATIONS (UEFA) IN DEALING WITH RACISM

Dahlan Yusuf Butuna[1], Saptopo Bambang Ilkodar[2]
[1,2] Department of International Relations, FISIP UPN "Veteran" Yogyakarta

Abstract

This article examines the failure of the Union of European Football Association (UEFA) to address racism in the world of football. UEFA has enacted a number of rules to prevent and reduce racist acts in football matches. Facts show that racist acts, especially those carried out by supporters, during 2013 to 2019 actually increased. This article tries to answer the question of why the UEFA regime is ineffective in dealing with the problem of racism in the world of football. The analysis was carried out by borrowing the theory of regime effectiveness developed by Arild Underdal. The author collected data by literature study method. The results of the analysis show that the UEFA regime is ineffective in dealing with racist acts in football matches in Europe because: (1) the problem of racism originates outside the world of football so it is impossible to solve it by football organizations alone; (2) the perpetrator of racism is the supporter, while UEFA rules cannot be applied to the supporter; (3) the interests of UEFA members are not aligned with each other, making it difficult to achieve collaboration; and (4) the governing organs do not have the required capacity.

Keywords: racism, football, regime, UEFA

Introduction

The issue of racism has long plagued various areas of life. Even so, it has not been revealed that racism also hits the field of sports, including football. Racism is understood as the belief that race is the primary determinant of human nature and ability; and racial differences result in permanent superiority for a race (Schaefer, 2008). In other words, human traits, such as intelligence and morality, depend on race, which ultimately gives rise to the notion that one race is superior to another.

Racism has long been a social problem in Europe. Racism has plagued the modern football world since the early days of the sport's development. The peak of the rampant racial insults on the football field occurred in the 1970s and 1980s (*Social Issues Research Centre*,

no date). These forms of insults include shouting "monkey!" aimed at black people because they are considered like monkeys.

The high level of racism in football in Europe in those years was influenced by the rise of the fascist movement. At that time many European football clubs had strong elements of fascism. Clubs that have element of fascism include Lazio in Italy, Chelsea in England, and Real Madrid in Spain. (*Social Issues Research Centre*, no date).

Football is the most watched sport. Europe is a prosperous region with a strong football culture and is a barometer of world football. The advancement of European football encourages the involvement of people from various racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds to participate as players, staff, or spectators. With the variety of communities involved, actions containing elements of racism become difficult to avoid.

The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), which is the governing body of European football, is trying to address the issue of racism in the sport. Racism is contrary to the principles of sportsmanship and equality. In addition, incidents of racism on the field can also hinder the course of the match.

UEFA is a non-governmental organization whose members are football associations of European countries. UEFA was founded in 1954 in Basel, Switzerland. The originators are the football associations of Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland (Vieli, 2014). Over time the membership of UEFA continued to grow, and now the organization has a total of 55 members, the majority of whom are football associations of European countries. The football associations of non-European countries include Israel, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan (UEFA.com).

The first steps taken by UEFA to address the problem of racism began in 2002. In that year UEFA published the "Ten-Point Action Plan for Professional Football Clubs", which contained plans to: (1) make announcements decrying racist chants in matches; (2) take action to prevent the sale of racist literature in and around the stadium; (3) taking disciplinary action against players involved in racial harassment; (4) remove all racist graffiti from stadiums, and (5) build partnerships with groups and agencies such as players' unions, supporters, schools,

voluntary organizations, and police, to develop proactive programs and make progress to raise awareness to eliminate racial harassment and discrimination (*Union of European Football Associations*, 2002)

The steps taken by UEFA based on the above action plan are not enough. The proof is that after these steps were taken, there was still cases of racism in the match. The statement of the House of Representatives of the United Kingdom Parliament in a report released in 2012 also mentioned that further action is needed to eliminate racism from football (House of Commons, no date).

Furthermore, in the 2013 congress, UEFA ratified the resolution *European football against racism* (UEFA.com, 2013). The resolution was issued by UEFA and its member associations (Chaplin & Michael Harrold, 2013). The resolution marks further steps by UEFA to strengthen efforts to address the problem of racism in European football, such as the creation of regulations that encourage referees to stop matches in the event of an incident of racism, an invitation for players to fully contribute, and the creation of strict penalties for employees, players, and supporters who commit acts of racism (Chaplin & Michael Harrold, 2013).

After the release of the resolution, incidents of racism still occur in major competitions held by UEFA and domestic competitions of European countries. An example of a racist incident that attracted public attention occurred during the 2020 European Championship qualifier between Bulgaria and England which was held on October 15, 2019 in Sofia, Bulgaria. The match was stopped twice because Bulgarian supporters shouted the word "monkey" aimed at black English players. ("Racism Ghosts Football Matches," 2021)

An anti-discrimination organization in football based in England and funded by the official governing body of English football (named *Kick It Out*), published a report on cases of racism in football in 2013-2019 presented in the graph below.

Graph 1
Incidents of Racism in Football
Reported to *Kick It Out* each Season

Based on the Kick It Out reports

The graph shows that from the 2013/2014 to 2019/2020 match seasons the number of reports of racism incidents tends to increase. In the 2019/2020 season, there was a decrease in the number of reports to below 100. However, this happened because of the implementation of isolation due to the COVID-19 pandemic so that the stadium was quiet.

Based on the graph above, it can be said that UEFA's policy in the form of a resolution *European football against racism* has not yielded good results. Despite the resolution, there has not been a significant decrease in the number of cases of racism in European football. Incidents of racism in major competitions held by UEFA and top leagues in Europe continue to occur. This article wants to outline the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the UEFA regime in overcoming the problem of racism in football.

There are a number of articles that discuss the problem of racism in the world of football, both written by researchers from within and outside the country. Some of the articles written by foreign scholars include the works of Cleland (2017), Peters (2021), Talesh and Levitt (2024), King (2020), and Burdsey (2018). Each author examines the problem of racism in football at different levels. Cleland examines the complexity of the problem; Perters is reviewing the effectiveness of sanctions; Talesh and Levitt examined racism in international football; King studied the scope of the European Union, and Burdsey studied only the case in the United Kingdom.

Cleland (2017) examines the problem of racism in the world of football with a focus on how racism remains an ongoing challenge in the sport despite various steps taken to overcome it. Cleland highlights the complexity of this issue and how the social and cultural structures that exist in football often exacerbate the problem. The authors also examine how discriminatory actions are often not taken seriously enough, as well as the impact they have on players and fans, especially those from minority racial groups.

Cleland uses a theoretical framework that combines the perspectives of sports sociology and social identity theory. In this context, he adopted theories that viewed racism as a phenomenon caused not only by individual actions, but also by broader social structures. Social identity theory focuses on how different racial groups are formed and treated in a social context, as well as how perceptions and stereotypes of certain racial groups are formed and reinforced by the football culture itself. Meanwhile, social dominance theory is used to explain how dominant groups, which are usually made up of white individuals or from certain social classes, often reinforce existing systems of discrimination.

In this article Cleland elaborates on the process of racism in European football evolving into a complex and constantly increasing problem. Cleland explores the various forms of racism that exist in football, ranging from the behavior of supporters in stadiums, to the discrimination experienced by players, to racial representation in the media.

Meanwhile, Peters (2021) conducted an analysis of the effectiveness of sanctions in reducing racism in football. Peters examined how sanctions imposed by football bodies, such as UEFA and FIFA, can reduce or stop racist behaviour on football pitches. The study focuses on several key aspects which include: the frequency and severity of cases of racism, the

effectiveness of sanctions, the response from clubs and associations, as well as evaluating how national football clubs and associations respond to sanctions imposed and whether the response affects the effectiveness of sanctions.

The research uses legal principles to understand how sanctions are applied and how the law can influence behavior. Peters also uses concepts from behavioral economic theory to understand how individuals and organizations respond to sanctions and incentives. In addition, the study also used deterrence theory to evaluate whether the sanctions given were strong enough to prevent racist behavior.

Peters analyzed data from a variety of sources, including reports from UEFA, FIFA, and national football associations, to examine the frequency and severity of cases of racism before and after the imposition of sanctions. The study involved case studies on several football clubs and leagues that have received sanctions for cases of racism. This case study helps to understand how sanctions are applied and how clubs are responding. Peters also conducted interviews with stakeholders, including UEFA officials, players, coaches and supporters, to gain first-hand insight into the effectiveness of the sanctions.

Peters concluded that the sanctions imposed by UEFA and FIFA were not always effective in reducing cases of racism. Many cases show that the sanctions given are not strong enough to prevent racist behavior. Therefore, a more comprehensive strategy, including education, awareness, and cooperation between football bodies, clubs, and the public, is needed to address racism in football. Peters emphasized the importance of the role of supporters and the community in reducing racism. Sanctions alone are not enough; broader cultural and social changes are needed.

Another researcher, Shauhin A. Talesh and Spencer L. Levitt (2024), examined the failure of regulations in dealing with racism in international football and analyzed why football organizations' efforts to respond to the issue were less effective. Both authors stated that although various anti-racism initiatives have been introduced, racism remains a pervasive problem in football. The author uses institutional organisational theory to understand how and why football organisations, both at the international, regional, and club levels, generally fail to address racism. This approach helps explain the many efforts made that are only symbolic and do not result in substantive changes in the organizational culture.

According to Talesh and Levitt (2024), despite various anti-racism policies and campaigns, many of these efforts only meet symbolic compliance without effective implementation. The author highlights football organizations that are often more focused on raising their image and meeting external pressures than on making the fundamental changes necessary to eradicate racism. They also found early facts about the lack of accountability and enforcement of sanctions as factors that exacerbated the situation. The authors conclude that to overcome the pervasive racism in football requires a more substantive approach than just symbolic obedience. They recommend structural reforms within the football organization, including increased accountability, stricter enforcement of sanctions, and a real commitment to changing the organization's culture.

Furthermore, King (2020) discusses the efforts made in dealing with the problem of racism in the world of European football. In this article, King examines the various anti-racism policies that have been implemented in European football leagues, as well as evaluating the effectiveness of these policies. The main problem studied in this article is the prevalence of racism in European football, especially related to discrimination against players or supporters who come from racial minority groups. King explores how racism remains a significant issue despite the various anti-racism policies and programs that have been implemented by football federations, clubs, and European leagues.

The theoretical framework used by King is a social and cultural perspective that focuses on the theory of racial identity and power in sports. The authors adopt an approach that considers the role of football institutions in reinforcing or changing social norms related to race and discrimination. Social critical theory is also used to analyze how anti-racism policies can be hampered by factors such as the cultural norms that prevail in football, the power imbalance between players, managers, and supporters, and resistance to change in the football community.

In the discussion, King explored various policies that have been implemented at the international and domestic levels, such as anti-racism awareness campaigns carried out by UEFA, FIFA, and national football associations. King also discussed smaller initiatives, such as educational programs aimed at football supporters, as well as sanctions given to perpetrators of racism in matches. The author also highlights the successes and failures of these policies, as well as the challenges faced in their implementation. King also emphasized the role of

supporters and the media in strengthening or reducing racial discrimination in football. According to King, the media often plays an ambiguous role, i.e. sometimes exacerbating racial stereotypes by portraying certain players or groups negatively, while on other occasions the media can be used as a tool to promote anti-racist values.

King concluded that there has been progress in anti-racism efforts in European football but that much remains to be done to address the issue effectively. Existing policies often fail to create lasting change due to a lack of deep commitment from the various parties involved, such as clubs, federations, players, and supporters. To that end, King emphasized the need for a more holistic approach, which involves structural changes in the football culture itself, as well as more intensive education about diversity and inclusivity from an early age.

Daniel Burdsey (2018) analyzes the complexity of the relationship between English professional football and racial issues. He disagrees with the view that racism has disappeared from English football. Burdsey points out that racism persists and is embedded in football's structure, culture, and institutions. Burdsey put forward the concept of the "paradox of the returning constant" to describe how racism in English football is discursively broken, minimized and denied, so its current emergence is considered a "return" to the problem. This approach highlights how racism is systemically embedded and historically rooted in the structure, culture, and institutions of English football.

In the paper, Burdsey outlines how racism contaminates English football and vice versa how football affects racial meanings and formations in wider society. He presents an analysis of how racism occurs in football and, importantly, how it can be handled. Burdsey concluded that to tackle racism in football in England requires a deeper understanding of how racism occurs and critical efforts to challenge it.

From the description above, it can be seen that this article has similarities with the articles above in two ways. The first similarity occurs with King's writing, which is to discuss racism in football in the European region. The second similarity occurs with Peters's writings which both discuss effectiveness. The difference lies in the perspective and the framework of analysis used. This article uses the perspective of international regimes, and thus the framework used is regime effectiveness.

Meanwhile, Cleland's writing is in line with this article in assessing the problem of racism in the world of football, namely that the problem is a complex problem. Talesh and Levitt's article also agrees with the view in this article that the problem of racism is a problem that occurs in various parts of the world. Burdsey's writing can be a real example that happened in one of the countries in Europe, namely England.

Method

The problems described above will be discussed using the theory of regime effectiveness compiled by Arild Underdal. According to Underdal (2002), the assessment of the effectiveness of a regime can be carried out through the analysis of three variables, namely the dependent variable, the independent variable, and the intervention variable.

The analysis of dependent variables in this theory is carried out by determining benchmarks; Then the benchmark is used to assess whether a regime is effective or not. According to Underdal, the assessment was carried out through analysis of outputs, results, and impact a regime. Outputs can be interpreted as things issued by a regime, for example in the form of regulations. The result is the behavior of the target group in accordance with the regulations issued by the regime (whether the group complies or not). Meanwhile, impact can be interpreted as a change in human behavior based on regulations and their level of compliance with regime regulations.

Determining the benchmark itself is difficult because there are so many benchmarks available. A regime can be effective based on one particular benchmark, but not effective based on another. Therefore, the assessment of the effectiveness of the UEFA regime in this study is based on three questions: (1) why has UEFA not been able to make a significant impact in its efforts to address the problem of racism in European football from 2013 to 2019?; (2) to what extent is UEFA needed to address cases of racism in European football?; and (3) what more efforts should UEFA be able to make?.

The first question will be answered with an analysis of the level of complexity of the problem and UEFA's capacity. The second question will be answered by raising the hypothesis

of a noncooperative situation, which is a hypothesis about the state of the issue discussed if the regime concerned does not exist. The third question will be answered with the collective optimum hypothesis, which is the hypothesis about what a regime should be able to do based on its capacity, as an effort to solve the problems faced.

Meanwhile, the analysis of independent variables includes two aspects: the level of complexity of the problem and the capacity of the regime to solve the problem. As Underdal explains, a problem will be more difficult to solve if it is complicated (*Malign*), and will tend to be easy to solve if the problem is relatively simple (*benign*).

Complexity of the problem

The main factor that determines whether a problem is complicated or not is the incompatibility (*Incongruity*). Forms of discrepancy include differences in motives between members of an organization. Differences in motives give rise to differences of opinion about the urgency of a problem. For example, party A considers a problem to have high urgency, while party B considers the problem trivial. So, party A will try to solve the problem seriously, while party B will not.

If the problem does not contain distortion of thrust, then the problem is synergistic. Problems contain elements of synergy means it is easier to solve (simple).

The incongruity is caused by at least two mechanisms. The first mechanism is externality, which is a form of habit in cost-benefit calculation. Underdal points out an example of externalities that are more or less as follows: company A causes environmental pollution. Half of the pollution extends to the next country. This means that 50 percent of the pollution is felt by Company A, and the remaining 50 percent is felt by neighboring countries. When company A decides to reduce pollution completely (100 percent) at its own cost, from the perspective of company A, it is the same as company A incurring 100 percent of the cost for 50 percent of the benefits only, because the remaining 50 percent of the benefits are felt by other countries, not company A.

The second mechanism is competition. Competition has a higher impact on complexity than externalities. Competition is a situation when one party considers the success of the other party to be negative. This happens because the welfare of the actors is determined by how good their performance is compared to other actors. The analogy is similar to the externality one, but this time company A has stiff competition with the company of the next country, and even with other companies in its own country. The companies are bound under the principle of *polluter pays,* that is parties who produce pollution must pay the cost of environmental damage. In such a situation, company A not only incurs costs to reduce the pollution it produce but also has the potential to lose market share (lose competition with other companies) and lose money because it pays the cost of environmental damage.

Two other indicators that also affect the complexity of the problem are symmetry-asymmetry and the division of the problem (*cleavage*). Symmetry can be interpreted as the similarity/difference in interests of the parties involved in the settlement effort. If a problem is categorized as symmetry, it means the parties involved have the same interests. If the parties involved have different interests, or their interests are not related to each other, the problem is not symmetrical (Underdal, 2002b). The second asymmetrical situation is one that describes a complicated problem.

The last indicator, problem splits, is divided into two: cumulative splits and cross-sector splits. Divisions can be called cumulative when the parties involved are in the same situation in all dimensions of the problem. So the parties who win (or lose) in one dimension will also win (or lose) in another dimension (Underdal, 2002b). For example, there is a dispute between group A and group B. The difference between the two groups includes several dimensions. Group A tends to consist of the poor, local residents, and adherents of communism. Meanwhile, group B tends to consist of rich people, immigrants, and liberalism. Based on this scenario, the members of group A have more than one thing in common, as well as the members of group B. This situation has the potential to give birth to camps. With the conflict between camps, the problem will be more difficult to solve (complicated).

When the analysis of the above indicators has been carried out, the research continues by assessing the complexity of the problem based on the following scale.

Table 1

Scale Used to Assess the Complexity of the Problem

Score	Problem pattern
Simple	It is more of a coordination problem, with the characteristics of a synergistic and contingent relationship. There are few or even no inconsistencies.
Mixed	The element of incompatibility is mixed with the element of synergy and contingency, and it is not clear which one dominates more.
Quite complicated	The core elements of incompatibility are limited to externalities. Competition and asymmetry are not among the prominent features.
Very complicated	Severe mismatch, accompanied by elements of competition and strong asymmetry. Cumulative divisions may also worsen the situation.

Source: Underdal, 2002a

The table shows the four levels of complexity of the problem: simple, mixed, moderately complicated, and very complicated. Each of the above levels of complexity has its own characteristics, namely the more elements of inconsistency in a problem, the more complicated the problem becomes.

Regime capacity

The analysis of the regime's capacity includes three things: institutional arrangements, power distribution, and regime capabilities. Institutional regulation is how an international organization/regime plays a role. The role of international organizations described by Underdal (2002b) is more or less the same as that described by Clive Archer (in Ridhotama, 2021): organizations can play the role of either an arena or an actor, or both. International organization's role as an arena means that they provide access for actors to solve problems. This means that the organization facilitates actors to negotiate to find a solution of a problem. An international organization can play as an actor if it is able to provide independent input in solving a problem or can strengthen the output.

Next is distribution of power. The aspect analyzed in the distribution of power is whether the power system of a regime tends to be unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. The more unipolar the power of a regime, the easier it is to shape collective decisions. A problem will be easier to solve if the regime's strength is centered on the driving parties (the advanced parties), and not the backward parties (Underdal, 2002b).

Still related to the distribution of power, we need to analyze the form of regime leadership: is it coercive (*coercive*) or generous (*benevolent*). An institution is called coercive if it controls the important events of other party based on its own values, and uses that control to make other party give up. Control is also used to impose interests. Generous institutions are the dominant institutions in providing collective goods at their own expense. Generous institutions can be more effective in maintaining the relationship between their members. However, because of its generosity, this kind of institutions can discourage its members from contributing.

By knowing the institutional arrangements and the distribution of regime power we can estimate to what extent the regime can create ideal solutions to be implemented. This is to assess the regime's capabilities.

The last is the ability of the regime. The assessment of the regime's ability is carried out by looking at the existence of instrumental leadership. The more complicated a problem is, the more instrumental leadership is needed. Instrumental leadership can come from several

sources, such as intergovernmental organization officials, working group chairs, or epistemic communities. (Underdal, 2002b).

Collaboration levels

The level of collaboration is an intervention variable, that is a variable that mediates the dependent and independent variables (Chandler & Munday, 2011). This variable is used as a concept to explain the relationship between dependent and independent variables (Shaw, 2018).

The analysis of the level of collaboration here serves to give a clearer picture of the regime's ability to solve a problem. The form of collaboration in a regime can be influenced by the complexity of the problem and the ability to solve the problem (Underdal, 2002b). The level of collaboration itself can be measured on six scales:

Table 2
Collaboration Level Scale

Level	Information
0	There is joint deliberation, but there is no joint action.
1	There is coordination of acting based on unwritten understanding.
2	There is coordination of action based on written regulations, but the implementation depends on the governments of each country. There is no centralized assessment of effectiveness.
3	Same as level 2 but there is a centralized assessment.
4	There is coordinated planning and national implementation. There is an assessment of effectiveness.
5	Everything (planning, implementation, and assessment of effectiveness) carried out in a coordinated manner.

Source: Underdal, 2002b

The table shows that the higher the level of collaboration of a regime, the better the collaboration within the regime. The good collaboration of a regime has a positive impact on the effectiveness of the regime, but the high or low level of collaboration itself can also be influenced by the complexity of the problem and the capacity of the regime in solving problems (Underdal, 2002b).

The pattern of the three variables above is as follows (Underdal, 2002b):

1. The complexity of the problem (independent variable) adversely affects the level of collaboration (intervention variable), as well as the impact and collective optimum (dependent variable).

2. The capacity of the regime (independent variable) affects the level of collaboration, as well as the collective impact and optimality.

3. The level of collaboration affects the collective impact and optimum (dependent variable).

Results and Discussion

Below is a table showing the incidents of racism before the resolution of *European football against racism* was enacted which occurs in various European football competitions, both held by UEFA and domestic competitions.

Table 3
Cases of Racism in European Football before 2013

Year	Tournament	Perpetrator	Victim	Action	Source
2009	Serie A Italy (Juventus vs Internazionale)	Juventus supporter	Mario Balotelli, Internazionale striker.	Racist chants	Reuters, 2009

2010	Unknown.	Lokomotiv Moscow supporters	Osaze Odemwingie, a former striker for Lokomotiv Moscow	Appearance of racist banners	Odemwingie (2010)
2011	Euro Qualification (Bulgaria vs England)	Bulgaria Supporter	England players: Ashley Cole, Ashley Young, and Theo Walcott	_	BBC News, 2023
	Liga Primer Rusia (Krylia Sovetov Samara vs Anzhi Makhachkala)	Supporters in the match	Roberto Carlos, Anzhi player	Banana throwing	inside World Soccer, 2023
	English Premier League (Liverpool vs Manchester United)	Luis Suarez, Liverpool player.	Patrice Evra, United player	Racist words	"Suarez Evidence Was 'Unreliable,'" 2011
2012	Turkish Super League (Fenerbahce vs Trabzonspor).	Emre Belozoglu, Fenerbahce player.	Didier Zokora, Trabzonspor player	Racist slur	"Emre Sentenced for Racist Abuse," 2014
	English League Cup (Chelsea vs Manchester United).	Chelsea supporter.	United striker Danny Welbeck.	Monkey guesture	"Chelsea Ban 'monkey Gesture'"

					Fan," 2012

The table shows many forms of racist action as racist yells, monkey gestures, or banana throwing. The act of throwing bananas is intended to equate a person with a monkey, considering the stereotype of monkeys who are known to love bananas. Most of these actions were carried out by supporters. There are two cases where the perpetrators are football players, namely Luis Suarez (2011) and Emre Belozoglu (2012).

The case of Luis Suarez is not an intentional case. Suarez at that time called Patrice Evra with the word "negro". The word is a common nickname in Suarez's home country (Uruguay), but it is considered racist where he plays (England) so he still gets punished ("Suarez Evidence Was 'Unreliable,'" 2011). So, based on the table above, there is only one case of racism involving the player as the perpetrator.

After UEFA issued a resolution of *European football against racism*, incidents of racism continue to occur in major European football competitions, as shown by the following table.

Table 4

Cases of Racism in European Football from 2013 to 2019

Year	Tournament	Perpetrator	Victim	Action	Source
2013	Serie A Italy (Internazionale vs AC Milan)	Internazionale supporters	Mario Balotelli, AC Milan player	Monkey singing and banana toy waving	Wheeler, 2013
2014	Serie A Italy (Atalanta vs AC Milan)	Atalanta supporters	Kevin Constant, Milan player	Banana throwing	"Atalanta Fined over Banana Incident," 2014

2015	Euro Qualification (Croatia vs Norway)	Croatian Supporters	_	Racist chants	Associated Press, 2015; Holiga, 2015
	Liga Primer Israel (Beitar Jerusalem vs Hapoel Kiryat Shmona)	Beitar Jerusalem supporter	Player: Hapoel Kiryat Shmona	Racist shouts	Lewis, 2015
2016	Liga Eropa (AC Sparta Praha vs Internazionale)	A group of Sparta Prague supporters	Internazionale's black player.	Monkey screams	Union of European Football Associations
2017 2018	Liga Super Serbia (Partizan vs FK Rad) Europa League (Zenit vs RB Leipzig).	FK Rad supporter Zenit supporters	Everton Luiz, Partizan's player Naby Keita, Leipzig player	Racist chants and banners	Associated Press, 2017 *UEFA Sanctions Zenit in Russia Racism Case before World Cup*, 2018
2019	Euro 2020 Qualifiers (Bulgaria vs England)	Bulgaria supporters	British players who are black	Singing and monkey sounds	"Racism Ghosts Football Matches," 2021

The table shows incidents of racism in 2013-2019, at least once a year. Just like the previous table, the last table shows that incidents of racism still occur in major competitions in Europe. Both tables show that generally the perpetrators of racist acts in football are supporters, not employees or players.

UEFA measures

UEFA's efforts to address the problem of racism can be traced back to the early 2000s. At that time, UEFA began to implement measures such as strengthening regulations and partnering with the anti-racism organization Fare (Football Against Racism in Europe). One of the steps taken is to publish the Ten-Point Action Plan, which is still in the form of basic steps. In the Action Plan, there is no threat of punishment against supporters, even though most racist incidents are committed by supporters.

The action plan includes making announcements to denounce racist slurs, taking disciplinary action against players involved in racial abuse, and working with other institutions (such as players' unions, supporters, schools, voluntary organizations, sponsors, local authorities, and the police) to develop proactive programs to eliminate racial harassment (Union of European Football Associations, 2002).

In 2013 UEFA issued a resolution European Football Against Racism which marks a further step for UEFA in tackling the problem of racism. The resolution contains more detailed rules than the Ten-Point Action Plan. The resolution also regulates punishment if supporters commit racist acts. The following are examples of the points of the resolution (Union of European Football Associations, 2022).

1. UEFA and its associations decided to redouble their efforts to eradicate racism from football. Stricter sanctions should be imposed for any form of racist behavior that affects the game.

2. The referee must stop, postpone or even leave the match if a racist incident occurs. In the early stages, the match will initially be stopped with a public warning. Second, the

match will be postponed for some time. Third, after coordinating with the security forces, the match will be abandoned if the acts of racism do not stop. In such cases, the competing teams get a draw.

3. A player or team employee found guilty of racist acts must be suspended for at least 10 matches (or a period of time appropriate for club representatives).

4. If a supporter of a club or national team engages in an act of racism, the penalty (for the first offence) is the partial closure of the stadium, in the part where the racist act occurred. For the second offense, the punishment is the full closure of the stadium as well as a fine. Supporters found guilty of acts of racism are prohibited from attending future matches, by the authorities.

5. National clubs and associations are required to run awareness programs to ward off racism. In addition, punishment for acts of racism must be accompanied by an awareness program. Education can help solve these problems, both in football and the wider community.

Although there has been a penalty regulation for act of racism by supporters, incidents of racism still occur in major competitions in Europe and are generally carried out by supporters.

Member Compliance and the Strictness of UEFA Articles

The fact that many incidents of racism after the resolution of *European Football Against Racism* was issued shows the non-compliance of football associations and clubs with UEFA regulations. A number of associations and clubs have been sentenced. Atalanta ("Atalanta Fined over Banana Incident," 2014) and Real Madrid (Christensen, 2014) was fined 40,000 euros and partially vacated the stadium in 2014; Croatia was sentenced to one match without spectators and a fine of 50,000 euros in 2015 (Associated Press, 2015). The Bulgarian national team which was fined 65,000 pounds and sentenced to two matches without spectators in 2019 ("Racism Ghosts Football Matches," 2021).

The UEFA Statute contains an order for UEFA members to implement effective policies and strict sanctions to eradicate racism. However, "effective policy" itself is still a question. To date, there are no policies that are definitively effective in eradicating racism. In addition, the limits of "strict sanctions" themselves are also unclear, even some parties consider the punishment given by UEFA to associations/clubs to be less strict. This can be seen from the nominal fine imposed by UEFA – when compared to the nominal fine imposed due to trivial matters. For example, in 2012 Nicklas Bendtner (then playing for Arsenal) was fined around £80,000 for showing the Paddy Power logo on his underwear during a celebration on the pitch; and in 2018 Besiktas was fined £30,000 due to a cat entering the field during a Champions League match (Finnis, 2019). The nominal fine in these cases is not much different from the nominal fine imposed on the clubs mentioned earlier, due to racist acts.

On the one hand, there is a need for UEFA to impose stricter penalties on associations/clubs whose supporters commit racist acts. But on the other hand, increasing punishment also does not guarantee the solution of the problem. This is because the party affected by the punishment is the association/club, while the association/club is not involved in acts of racism because the perpetrators are supporters. In addition, if associations/clubs are too disadvantaged due to heavy fines, the course of European football can even be disrupted.

The Complexity of the Problem of Racism in European football

It is possible that UEFA has not been successful in overcoming the problem of racism because the problem of racism itself is a complicated problem. Here the word "complicated" can be interpreted in two senses. First, the problem puts UEFA in a difficult situation to implement the ideal policy. Second, the ideal solution to the problem at hand is difficult to find.

There is a distortion between UEFA members in addressing the problem of racism. Members prioritize solving the problem of racism differently. This happens because not all UEFA members have the same urgency to address the problem of racism.

Football associations in England, Germany and Spain have a greater urgency to address the problem of racism than associations in Serbia or Poland. This happens because associations in England, Germany, and Spain are popular associations so they have more diverse players and spectators in terms of race and culture. In those three countries, acts of racism are more easily exposed and have more potential to disrupt the course of the match.

At this point, the mechanism of externalities and competition begins to be seen. The externalities in this case occurred as follows: at its own expense association A managed to overcome the problem of racism committed by its supporters. The other party, namely association B, which used to be a victim of racist acts by supporters from association A, now no longer receives racist insults. This means that association B feels the benefits of the success of association A's business.

A soccer player's pay is determined by how well he performs compared to other players. For football associations in the countries of Serbia or Poland, where football has little influence, it is possible to prioritize improving game performance rather than trying to eradicate racism.

The assumption that the most influential football associations tend to be more serious about overcoming racism is not always true. An example is racism in Italian football. Italy is one of the most influential football countries in Europe and the world. Even so, the seriousness of the Italian football association to overcome the problem of racism is still lacking when compared to other associations. In fact, in a number of cases, the perpetrators of racist acts are actually people who work in sports organizations in the country, such as former FIGC president and pundit Luciano Passirani (Antonsich, 2019).

Based on the above explanation, it can be stated that the problem of racism in European football has an element of incompatibility, as evidenced by the existence of an externality and competition mechanism, even though the element of competition is not prominent. This information is enough to conclude that this issue is complicated. However, if other information is added, and the problem is matched to the scale shown in table 1, then the problem falls into the category between the problems quite complicated and very complicated. However, because the element of competition in this problem is not prominent, and this problem tends to be

symmetrical and has cross-sectoral hemispheres, it can be said that this problem is more classified as quite complicated.

UEFA Capacity

In an effort to address the problem of racism, UEFA conducts independent input. Examples of such independent inputs include: (1) the publication of a Ten-Point Plan of Action to encourage clubs and associations to combat racism; (2) providing assistance funds to members to combat racism; (3) building cooperation with anti-racism organizations, such as Fare (Football Against Racism in Europe); and (4) organizing anti-racism campaigns, such as the "*Say No to Racism*" campaign (UEFA.com, 2016).

UEFA's distribution of power tends to be centered on the countries whose football is most influential like England, France, Italy, and Germany. As outlined before, the most influential football associations tend to have a higher urgency to address the problem of racism so they act more seriously. This means that UEFA's strength is centered on the driving side.

Such a distribution of UEFA's power could discourage associations with less influential football (such as in Serbia or Poland) from contributing. In fact, the UEFA has the authority to force members to contribute. But UEFA didn't do that. The reason UEFA stayed away from coercive actions was because these actions were contrary to UEFA principles, namely peace and mutual understanding. In addition, coercive actions have the potential to make associations and clubs withdraw from UEFA membership, which can ultimately damage the course of European football.

Given that UEFA tends to be generous, the decision to eradicate racism that can truly bind UEFA members can only be formed from collective decisions. However, because UEFA's power system is not unipolar, collective decisions are not easily achieved.

In the UEFA Statute it is stated that in Congress, each member has one voting right. The most influential and least influential associations have the same voting rights. In other

words, the power in UEFA is multipolar. The problem is further complicated because each association has different priorities or preferences in dealing with the problem of racism.

So, UEFA is not able to make decisions that are complied with by all its members. Therefore, other solutions are needed. Such a solution can emerge from the instrumental leader.

In UEFA there are judges called Expert Juries, who are appointed to specific tasks. The Expert Jury is a kind of working group. But it is a pity that based on the existing list of judges, there are no special judges assigned to deal with the problem of racism. Even though, for example, UEFA had an Expert Jury to deal with the problem of racism, they can be instrumental leaders who can come up with constructive solutions. It is possible that the absence of an Expert Judge tasked with dealing with the problem of racism is due to the absence of personnel in UEFA who are experts in the field. So, it can be stated that UEFA itself has limited capabilities in the field of eradicating racism.

However, there is a party outside UEFA that can be called an epistemic community, namely Fare, which is an international organization that houses individuals, informal groups, and organizations that aim to eliminate inequality in Europe through the sport of football. (Fare network, t.t.) The cooperation between UEFA and Fare started in 2002. The form of activities includes the organization of the Unite Against Racism conference (UEFA.com, 2003) and the Football Action Weeks campaign (UEFA.com, 2015).

Although Fare can play the role of instrumental leader, UEFA would be more effective if it had an Expert Jury specifically tasked with finding solutions to the problem of racism because the Expert Jury is an integral part of UEFA. The more integrated epistemic communities are in the decision-making process, the more effective the regime in question will be (Underdal, 2002b).

Despite the existence of an instrumental leader, UEFA has limitations to prevent supporters from committing racist acts. That's because the number of supporters is huge, comes from a variety of backgrounds, and has no direct ties to UEFA or other football bodies. This is different from club employees, players, or other staff. If any of them commit racist acts, UEFA, the club, or the football association concerned can punish them.

Since UEFA cannot directly punish supporters, when there is an incident of racism committed by a fan, UEFA punishes the club concerned with penalties in the form of stadium closures, fines, and points deductions and disqualification from the competition if the incidents occur repeatedly. The punishment aims to provide a deterrent effect to supporters because the racist acts they commit will have an impact on the clubs they support. In addition, the punishment could also encourage clubs to carry out programs to suppress acts of racism. However, as previously explained, punishment against associations/clubs does not guarantee that it will be able to change the behavior of supporters. If such a punishment is aggravated, the association/club will be greatly disadvantaged and the course of football can even be hampered.

UEFA collaboration level

The UEFA as a regime that tends to be generous does not have the capacity to control the behavior of its members. There is coordination carried out by UEFA members, for example through the UEFA Congress, through written regulations such as resolutions *European football against racism,* and through the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations. Although there is coordination, there is no assessment of organizational effectiveness carried out by UEFA centrally. Therefore, based on Table 2 above, the level of UEFA collaboration is at level 2.

The level of collaboration illustrates UEFA's inability to control the views of its members to prioritise the eradication of racism. Although UEFA has made regulations aimed at addressing the problem of racism in football, the implementation of these rules depends on the individual UEFA members.

The absence of a centralized assessment of effectiveness leaves UEFA with no information on the level of success of the measures that have been taken. So, there is no description of what next steps to prioritize, what steps to improve, and more.

Conclusion

UEFA has made various efforts to address the problem of racism, which can generally be classified into three: punishment, campaigning, and cooperation with other parties. Even so, from 2013 to 2019 there has been no decrease in the number of incidents of racism in European football. UEFA has difficulty overcoming the problem of racism committed by supporters because the number of supporters is very large, has a very diverse background, and is not directly bound by UEFA laws. In addition, the root of the problem of racism itself exists in society in general, not specifically in football.

UEFA does not have the capacity to control its members to respond decisively to acts of racism. Not all UEFA members prioritize the eradication of racism. Although UEFA already has a regulation that requires all members to eradicate acts of racism, the implementation of the rule depends on each member.

UEFA may be able to provide heavier fines/penalties to prevent racist acts committed by supporters. The problem is, because punishment is not imposed on supporters, the punishment does not guarantee that it can overcome the problem of racism. Associations/clubs, which are basically not involved in acts of racism, can actually be harmed and the course of football in Europe can be disrupted.

Although it has not been successful, the presence of UEFA is needed to continue to suppress racism in football. If UEFA had not taken action to address the problem of racism, it is very possible that racism in football would still be as bad as it was a few decades ago or even worse, given the rise of neofascist movements.

With the continued actions taken by UEFA to fight racism, especially through anti-racism campaigns, the public's perception of racist acts is slowly changing. In the past, people considered racism to be commonplace, now they realize that racism is not commonplace. The positive impact of that effort can be felt now, as shown by the situation of racism in European football that is not as bad as it was a few decades ago.

Since the problem of racism in football has not been fully resolved, UEFA urgently needs to form a special Expert Jury tasked with finding solutions to the problem of racism.

UEFA's cooperation with anti-racism organizations is insufficient because these organizations are not an integral part of UEFA. Meanwhile, the Expert Jury is an integral part of UEFA.

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