

## CONTEXTUALIZING THE PREMISE OF THE AMBIVALENCE IN THE INDO EXPERIENCE

**June Cahyaningtyas**

Lecturer, Dept. of International Relations, UPN "Veteran" Yogyakarta

Jl. Babarsari 2 Tambakbayan, Yogyakarta 55281

E-mail: june.cahya@gmail.com

### **Abstrak**

Kehadiran Postcolonialism dalam khazanah Ilmu Sosial, termasuk Hubungan Internasional di dalamnya, dirayakan sebagai sebuah jalan untuk memahami realitas sosial dengan cara yang berbeda, karena Postcolonialism menawarkan suatu pembacaan baru terhadap dunia dan konsep-konsep yang membentuknya, yang selama ini diterima secara baku. Kecenderungan postcolonialisme menempatkan praktik kolonialisme dan penulisan sejarah Dunia Ketiga sebagai referennya menunjukkan peran penting Sejarah dalam formulasi antitesis yang dikembangkannya. Selain sejarah, Postcolonialism memberi tempat yang istimewa bagi Budaya dan praktik kebudayaan, yakni sebagai situs kreatif yang memungkinkan subyek-subyek termarginalkan berperan aktif melalui laku resistensi. Dengan mengambil konsep ambivalensi (*ambivalence*) yang banyak dikembangkan dalam kajian Postcolonialism, tulisan ini hendak menunjukkan bahwa penekanan yang berlebih terhadap budaya dan sejarah, serta pengabaian pada aspek ekonomi politik, menjadikan interpretasi Postcolonialism terjebak dalam kritiknya sendiri atas paradigma dominan yang dinilai esensial. Secara konkrit, elaborasi atas konsep ambivalensi dalam tulisan ini akan diterapkan dalam sebuah kasus: orang-orang Indo di Belanda.

**Kata Kunci:** ambivalensi, Postcolonialism, Indo

### **Background**

On March 2004, a 15-minute film called *Fitna*, produced by a right-wing Dutch politician Geert Wilders was posted on the maverick video-sharing website liveleak.com. Within a moment, the propagandist content of the film sparks the storm of agony, dispersed from the national, the continental, and to most of the world.<sup>1</sup> Through *Fitna*, Wilder alleged that Muslim migrants had continuously threatened the survival of European population and democratic institution.<sup>2</sup> Hate speech derived from the preset racial and imperialistic prejudice is not at all new in Netherlands. But, what makes it interesting is that, while Wilder is famous for his political stance against naturalization law of Muslims in Europe and against migration, Wilder himself is a migrant (RNW, 2009).

Wilder's positionality against migrants whom he perceives as a threat to the Dutch culture seems to be contradictory. Wilder is not only a migrant but also an Indo, a descendant of

an Indo-Dutch family. Following the imperialistic conception of half-blood or mixed-race people, it is perceived that being an Indo means neither being a pure Indonesian, nor being a pure Dutch. Therefore, Wilder actually share the common problem of being the 'Other', because he could never be a pure (*sic*) Dutch. In spite of this fact, it appears that Wilder put himself on the position of Dutch mainstream by his phony attitude.

Based on the slight fact that shown by the Wilder's case above, it is interesting to find out the way in which Indos adjust themselves in Netherlands. Focusing on their inhabitation in Netherlands, this paper tries to describe their effort to cope with the violence embedded in the normalizing narrative of Dutch multiculturalism, which delimits their self identification. Broadly descriptive, the paper formulated in the way the historical setting is narrated in a rather chronological order and ended with the cross-examination of the notion of 'ambivalence'. The purpose of this paper is to cross-examine the

context of ambivalence, which has continuously been valorized in Postcolonial study as being the site of creativity, out of which resistance was celebrated, not as an exertion but as a resourceful defiance, through the case of Indo experience.

## Discussion

### Indo within the Construction of the-Other

Indo-Dutch (*Indische Nederlanders*), or briefly termed 'Indo', is a label given to people whose parents are of mixed origin—Indonesian and Dutch.<sup>3</sup> During Dutch colonization in Indonesia, Indo was put in the middle class, along with the Foreign-Orientals (Arab, Indians, British-Indies, and the like). Their position was lower than the Europeans, but higher than that of the Natives. Unlike Chinese whose demands for equal status were strongly resisted by Dutch parliament, the Indo had the chance to be re-classified. Their status depended mainly on whether their fathers recognized them by law. In 1892, the offspring of Dutch fathers and Indonesian mothers were granted Dutch nationality on condition that they were recognized by the fathers, both the mother and the children have been converted to Christians, and/or the children have European upbringing.

As the government operated on the principle that 'racial consciousness is the lifeblood of colonial society', unless there was favorable reception, all aspects of life were racially distinguished. The Dutch's intention to sustain its colonization was carried up by presenting the differences of identity among its colonial society. Because the Dutch constituted as White (European), its supremacy then caused negative stereotype of Color/Black (non-European). Indies colony was maintained by race-based hierarchy, and variations on race-relation or idealistic outlook were to be seen as defiance to the perfunctorily colonial system. The separateness and the ambivalence were seen in the application of law, taxation, and ways of being treated by the state authorities.<sup>4</sup>

As soon as Japanese surrendered and the new Indonesian government established in 1945, the rising sentiment against foreign people reached its peak.<sup>5</sup> Going to Netherland was not actually the preferred option, lest they had. But post-independence Indonesia was no longer

their home, because it was the native who hold the power there and people who had any stapled relations with colonial Dutch were at the margin of the society. Mass political resentment to have anything to do with 'Dutchness' nerved them. Heated situation among the grassroots who consider any Indonesians who had become part of the Dutch kinfolk or service to the Dutch military personnel as traitor, gave not much option for them to leave for Netherlands, hoping that they would find it ease as a new home. On the other hand, the government attempted to discourage this wave of migrants for fear that they would not be able to adjust in Dutch society.<sup>6</sup> The fact was that, as a half-blood their creation was born out by the Dutch colonial history in Indonesia and their growth was to be seen as the debauchery for the pride of Empire.

Despite resistant efforts by the government, Indo generation insisted to come to the Netherlands.<sup>7</sup> During the 1945-1958, the waves of migrations to Netherlands were conducted through three phases. First phase, 1945-1948, the Dutch who went to Holland were composed of widows, orphans, and old pensioners. Some of them were Dutch officers who went on leave. Second phase, 1949-1951, the Dutch imperial government mobilized the civil servants and military personnel who worked for the Dutch and were used to with the Dutch way of life. Third phase, 1952-1958, major wave of Indo, in which those who were totally unacquainted with the Dutch way of life found their abode. Dutch government had expected only the Indo who were officially recognized by their Dutch fathers and were able to upgrade their status to a Dutch citizen. Yet, many of whom were also the Moluccans who served as the extended manpower of the Dutch colonial army and were not yet mobilized when *Republik Maluku Selatan* (Republic of the South Mollucas) declared independence from the Republic of Indonesia in 1950 also left for Holland. By 1951, not less than 12.500 Mollucan military personnel of KNIL has already left for Netherlands.

In order to detach these newcomers from criminalities because of their drifting, the government tried to provide reserved settlements, menial jobs, and bare minimum ration. Despite this provision, many of them did not feel at home.

Once having a luxury life at the colony, wives were now forced to do her own cooking, cleaning, shopping, and bring up their own children. Many of them experienced it as a form of degradation and humiliation. Netherlands made them come to terms with the reality of unemployment, dispossession, and displacement. The settlement they lived were disused army barracks and former concentration camp. Once they worked, they had to pay 60% payment to the state for their board and lodging in camps. The camp situation was intolerable. Fabricated houses were collapsing, sanitation inadequate, and community isolated. They had their own school and Protestant Church. They used to speak Malay at the camp and only to speak Dutch outside the camp and at the school.<sup>8</sup> This mode of segregation policy can be read as an immediate step taken by the Dutch government to host the Indo and the Mollucans of ex-military personnel considered as mere temporary migrants, and/or a subsequent step of discouraging their residing in Holland.

Given that the emotional and historical ties of Indo to Holland were totally underestimated, their inhabiting Holland was undesired and their integration in Dutch society was impossible. The sons and daughters born out of this condition realize how difficult the situation was. Most of them born during the 1950s postwar situation faced the melancholic attachment of their parents to the colony and the challenge to acclimatize in a comparatively novel situation, at the same instant.

### Assimilation Policy in Netherlands

Only after the government realized the risk of political affairs with the allies and the postwar political economic burden that might be accused by the nationalist of the former colonies that consideration of Indo as Dutch citizens finally put into context. In 1960s, the Dutch government opted for an intensive policy campaign which was basically founded on the demand put upon migrants' ability to familiarize themselves to the Dutch way. By this, migrants are required to identify and to be loyal to the Dutch norms and values.<sup>9</sup>

While the government abandons the term assimilation and disclaims as an immigration country—by, for example, dump the word

'immigrant' into 'temporary residents' (*tijdelijke verblijvers*)—the country unreservedly accept the public narrative of successful immigration.<sup>10</sup> For Pattinama, it projected Dutch self-images of race and class which suits the existing ideas of Dutch identity. It also fosters image of Dutch's hospitality, tolerance, and liberal attitude, that "the achieved assimilation may even be regarded as a final tribute to the once revered Dutch colonial enterprise."<sup>11</sup>

At the exterior, there is no misgiving in referring the success story of Netherlands with its multicultural policy, since most of the migrants are well adapted by having quietly settled down without causing any trouble. In fact, compared to the Surinamese, Turks, or Somalians, which altogether constitutes the migrant assemblage, the Indo-Dutch and their descendents pretty well adjusted to the social and cultural norm inquired by the Dutch. They, for example, shares what the mainstream culture holds: speaking with the same language, sharing the same religion, having fine education and thriving economic. Notwithstanding their social achievement, however, Indo-Dutch migrants are considered *the objects*, rather than *the subject* of this success story. Symbolic violence operates through the national narrative that gives little space for subverting it. Rather than breaking up the silence, this symbolic violence lead people to condone, while comply with the given stricture by struggling to become good Dutch citizen.<sup>12</sup>

### Indo-Dutch Performance as the Good Citizen

Dutch society is divided between the notion of *autochtonen* or insider (native: the Dutch) and *allochtonen* or outsider (non-Dutch). *Allochtonen* roughly submitted to groups that are lagging behind socially, culturally and economically and, therefore, potentially engaged in criminal behavior.<sup>13</sup> While efforts to explain the social context of discrimination and ethnic stereotypes are made, the concept itself embodied the idea of race, ethnicity, and nationality to the extent that the economic and social problem hoisted. Since education, language incorporation, and economic achievement, are all matters as conditions to be met by this power-position categories, Indo acknowledge the necessity to identifying and coping with the Dutch way in

order to lodge in the Dutch society.

Sustaining the society, Dutch politics and institutions are built upon the inheritance of the polder model, which premised under the need to pacifying past and conflict of interests by dialogue and consensus seeking strategies. While it campaigns on tolerance and compromise, the major proposal was actually on majority consensus and political legitimacy. By this, any radical standpoints or black-or-white positions tend to be ignored, avoided, excommunicated, ridiculed, or symbolically assassinated in Dutch public sphere.<sup>14</sup>

Being a half-race, Indo has experienced the liminality of being implacable foreignness, continually on the margin, lingering outsider, anyplace. Although race is only one among many identity markers that functions as resources that can be deployed contextually and situationally, race affects the way in which physiognomy, origin, color, and culture are to be identified with. Mixed-race is seen as a product of miscegenation, defy the natural order of things that code human's constriction of bodily passage.

The contempt against Indo during the colonial and in early post-independent Indonesia shows how mixed-race have been a continuous site of social anxiety. In order to avoid derision, veneration of recognition is needed for Indo to fit themselves in Dutch society, which cost their other-Self respect. Thus, hoping to get recognition, performance of the Indo to be a good Dutch citizen is paradoxically conducted through obliteration of differences. Here lies the ambivalence of the ambivalence.

### **The Missing Moment of Mimicry in First and Second Generation**

Bhabha proposed the lexicon of the ambivalence, which describes a continual fluctuation between wanting one thing and wanting the opposite. Ambivalence refers to attraction toward and repulsion from an object, person, or action. In Bhabha's theory, ambivalence disrupts the clear-cut relationship of domination and subordination, and conflates the complicity and resistance which exists within this fluctuating relationship. By celebrating satisfyingly instability, ambiguity, and contradiction, ambivalence staples the way in

which the mainstream narrative of postcolonial countenance.

While ambivalence mainly focused on the cultural disruptions of the normative dominance, ambivalence abandon the fact that human relations are structured around the weight of political economy. This is exactly what was actually seen in the case of Indos in the Netherlands. The first and the second Indo generation were subsumed into the mainstay of the normative standard of the Dutch society in order to get recognition. Ideally, recognition is attained by social and public validation through affirmation of difference. But when difference is not perceived and hardly affirmed, positionality deployed and employed as a strategy to comprehend one's position in the social order of thing, that is where and what one belong, or do not belong.<sup>15</sup>

Hangover by the preeminence of the Dutch rule in colonial society, first generation Indos had little choice but to comply with the Dutch 1960s' call for rapid acclimatization. As for the second generation Indos, they fully learnt how to keep out from more humiliation and degradation by detaching their authenticities from public surveillance. Pattynama uses the word masquerade to designate the way in which second generation Indo struggled with the normalizing violence they had to face in regards to humiliation and degradation, but the word masquerade may lose its merit since there is nothing but silence that comes into the fore.<sup>16</sup>

Performance through silence is a passing over, a total ambivalence that fails to produce ambivalence. As a complete desertion, silence fails to unleash the doubleness in the making out of the mask performance. Silence excuses the failure of partial incorporation in favor of forged recognition. All in all, silence is a violation to the celebratory notion of creative agency and subversive authenticity in postcolonial study.

Bhabha and other mainstream postcolonial theorists keep out the issue of recognition in favor of play through the notion of ambivalence. Focusing on the subjectivity of the colonized subject, Bhabha gives emphasis on the productive character of colonial power through its excesses. In mimicry, resistance does not manifested in an offhanded, physical form of confrontation. Through the repetitive production of slippages,

excesses, and differences, mimicry gain its double articulation through appropriation of the inappropriateness. Mimicry so to speak, moves beyond the normalizing violence of the colonizer right from its limitation and its indeterminacy. By mimicry, Bhabha suggest the way in which resistance has been purported out of ambivalence through the strategy of double vision.<sup>17</sup>

### **Cultural Turn of the Third Generation, Is It Resistance After All?**

Along with silence at public realm, Indos reflected their beingness by confining the relic of cultural practices of *pesta dansa* (dance nights), *koempoelan malam minggu* (get-together on week-ends), and *pasar* (fair) in private realm, where ethnic Indonesian food are usually served. Living a dual life of maintaining the great accomplishment narrative of integration to Dutch society by, at the same time, longing for the fun-filled times in the Indies, the second generation confers to their offspring the lumber out of inclusion/exclusion, public/private, and past/present fixture.

The dual identity of their parents and the historical ordeal of their grandparents leave the third Indo generation unsatisfactorily with unanswerable queries of the culture harbored upon them. On account of internet, by means of virtual social gatherings, sentiments of the differences are shared and communicated. During the past few years, Indo youths have created their own websites, chatrooms, organized groups, clubs, and associations and held parties, social events and meetings, all with the objective to preserve and express their mutual feeling of solidarity and belonging and thus reviving the Indo culture. Contrary to the silence and obliteration of complete identity opted by the first and second generation, the latest generation create their own clothing fashion, hair style and uttering street slang to emphasize their roots.<sup>18</sup>

Not even a fear or embarrassment, Indo cultural practices are bursting into the Dutch scene with proud and even vengeance. Grown up by the split performance of their predecessors, the latter generation proudly comes out with the cultural resurgence. In fact, they crave maximum attention. They express their Indo pride in an almost militant manner by wearing badges,

T-shirts, or tattoo. The emergence has indeed something to do with the revival of interest in Indo community. And of course, the explosive growth of this revival through varieties of Indo cultural exhibitions implies a boon for Indo culture. It is a cultural turn indeed. But is it mere hype or a real renaissance?<sup>19</sup>

There are empty number of questions worth asking before landing on the essentialized valorization of agency and resistance. Some questions like, whether the cultural explosion set up with consciousness and deliberation? Whether there really is a single, authentic, and original element of culture that is being put forward? Whether this explosion takes on the experience and expectation of all Indos in Netherlands? Whether they really assume the role and responsibility to preserve Indos culture and, thus, have all the rights to voice for the Indos after all? Whether it is meant to challenge the mainstream notion of Dutch cultural assimilation? And, along with this assumption, whether they are willing to negate the partial economic privilege they have already had through the structure they are condemned? By positing these questions, taking on hybridity as a point of departure for analyzing the present situation may be disapproving.

Bhabha conceptualize hybridity as a creative resistance which located in a third space, which mediates the first and the second space. The first space posits the concrete and material circumstances, while the second space posits the mental and imagined representation, out of which practices of exclusion offers possibilities for liberation. Without any proper answer for all the questions posed above, the latest performance of the latter generation may be explained fitly by strategy of positionality, rather than hybridity.

Positionality is one of the viable strategies of performance. By positionality, individuals perceive their situatedness by discerning their positions in the social order of things, that is where and to what one belong, or do not belong. By positionality, Indos are seen as plural, rather than homogenized entity, encapsulates those of the first generation to the latest generations, assisted by different modalities and entangled by context of appropriation. Although race is something that is given, but attention to grasp the context, meaning, and practice are needed

to understand the processes and outcomes of collective identification.

Positionality, more willingly than ambivalent mimicry, is a pragmatic and practical strategy feasible to the needs of Indos on holding memberships in various social relations within a larger society. By keeping on positional performance, Indos have the ability to travel across different roles and experiences by keeping intact their particular experiences and situatedness. What's more, the notion of the performance moves beyond mere cultural valorization, since it enmeshes desire and reality altogether.

### Conclusion

In order to understand the way in which ambivalence, through mimicry and hybridity took place in postcolonial situation, the paper has tried to elaborate the context of ambivalence among the Indos. Having quietly settled down without causing any trouble, Indo meet the nation's expectations of being co-operative and non-distinctive Dutch citizens. But, the Wilder's case shows that performance is actually being played at in the construction of a fit assimilation. In fact, the apparent total integration of Indos in Dutch society, which is always regarded as a great accomplishment, can never be condoned at the expense of a potential obliteration of an entire culture.

Based on the mode of ambivalence that Bhabha proposed in the notion of mimicry, identification is constantly lack of legitimacy. In mimicry, no compromise could ever be achieved effectively because innate difference posited in racial markers. Indeed, racism itself is not given in difference per se, but is socially constructed response to markers of difference.<sup>20</sup> Thence, examination of race relation cannot solely depend on history as such, but has to pay attention to context, meaning, and practice as well, for they influence the processes and outcomes of collective identification. Even more, Bhabha's ambivalence lend on the play of text and language, which is not always to be found as an equal capital in all walks of life.

This may be the defect not only in the work of Bhabha, but in much of the works of Postcolonial study. Although language and

literature play an undeniable role in the process of colonization, but colonization itself cannot be reduced in terms of language. Since coloniality has never been confined to textual domain alone, text shall not be the only domain appraised by postcolonial theorists as a site where resistance is articulated. With reference to Parry, coloniality cannot be understand without positing "the economic impulses that underlying territorial expansion, military expropriation of geographical space and physical resources, the exploitation of human labor and institutional repression".<sup>21</sup> It means that, more features need to be elaborated in order to perceive the nature of colonial discrimination, appropriation, and struggle. All things considered, essentializing the work of the culture as the master narrative of all resistance may end up with fixity and redundancy.

### END NOTES

(Endnotes)

1 The film, begins and ends with one of the twelve controversial Danish cartoons, links the cut verses of the Koran with images and audio of recent attacks by Muslim fundamentalists, pictures of September 11 attack's victims, the beheading of a man by masked gunmen, the shot of a Muslim women draped in burqa, and the video of a call for 'jihad' from Muslim clerics. See <http://www.maverick.com/> or <http://www.youtube.com/> for full access to the film.

2 While the film attacks at Muslims, Wilder is popularly known as a member of Dutch legislative who speak against migration. According to Wilder, migrants may attack the Dutch society from two fronts: demographically and culturally. Demographically, *Muslim migrants* have tendency to outnumber the Dutch population because of their higher fertility rate and their likelihood to have a big family. Culturally, *all migrants* have potential to bring their degraded, non-civilized, and perilous attitude which runs the danger for the sustainability of Dutch national culture and political institution. Saidazimova, G. (2008). Islam: Dutch Anti-Koran Film Appears on Internet. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. 28 March 2008.

3 Their initial presence can be traced back to the Dutch colonial history in Indonesia. In the so-called Dutch East-Indies, until 1870, there were never more than a few thousand Europeans, chiefly men. Many of them took native wives or sexual partners and had children of mixed descent. While the small number of them might have been raised in complete attachment of family life, most of them suffered

from personal connection and social gratification. For much of the latter, their beingness transcribes the historical narrative of *Nyai*, and the larger historical story of the spate of complex inferiority among the colonized society during the Dutch colonization. In *Bumi Manusia* (trans. *The Earth of Mankind*), Toer explicated the issue of *Nyai* (Indonesian mistress) perfectly well of how a daughter was traded in, by an irrepressible-ambition of her parents to hold a respected-by-the-society's Dutch officer position, to a Dutch master as a mistress. Despite her accomplished autodidact on her mastery of the Dutch language, her manners and grooming, also her principality on the company her husband is to oversee, the protagonist *Nyai Ontosoroh* continually rejected and faced coarse insults from various fronts in society: the Dutch community, the Native society, and even from the son and the daughter whom she raised and hoped for dearly, in terms of race, class, and gender marginalization. The situation in due course gave her constant frustration, anger, and bitterness. The problem of split personality was then found on her son, Robert, and her daughter, Annelies. See Toer, P. A. (1980). *Bumi Manusia* (trans. *The Earth of Mankind*). Jakarta: Hasta Mitra.

4 See Vickers, A. (2005). *A History of Modern Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 28.

5 Japanese has, more or less, invested the Dutch hate campaign in tandem with the politics of Indonesian national self-determination, since it went halves with the Japanese interest to despise the former Dutch colonial influence in Indonesia.

6 They, for instance, put limitation on the number of the ship passengers and curb the intensity of the airflight timetable. See Veenhoven, W. A. & Ewing, W. C. (1976). *Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom: A World Survey. Volume V*. Brill: Stichting Plurale Samenlevingen. p. 159-160.

7 Among them were daughters, sons, or wife (or mistress), on whose account of bits and pieces of address, picture, memo, or other family files, aimed to look up their fathers, husbands, or any relatives as soon as they arrived in. See Cornelius, W. A. (2004). *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspectives*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

8 *Ibid.*, supra note 6, p. 161-16, 165

9 Citing Lucassen (1998: 11), Pattynama says that the Dutch concept of assimilation put the ethnic-cultural and social position of Indo-Dutch similar to that of the supposedly homogenous indigenous people in the receiving society. By this token, the newcomers are seen and see themselves first and foremost as members of the indigenous society. Pattynama, P. (2000). Assimilation and Masquerade: Self-Construction of Indo-Dutch Women. *European Journal of Women Studies*. Vol. 7, pp. 281-299

10 The major theme dominating the discourse on migrants in Netherlands narrates, and ends with the conclusion of, her successfulness in dealing with the problem of migration and in applying the policy of multiculturalism. See, for example, Bagley, C. (1971). Immigrant

Minorities in Netherlands: Integration and Assimilation. *International Migration Review*, Vol. 5 (1): 18-35. Or, Van De Vijver, F. J. R., Schalk-Soekar, S. R. G., Arends-Toth, J. & Breugelmans, S. M. (2006). Cracks in the Wall of Multiculturalism? A Review of Attitudinal Studies in the Netherlands. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*. Vol. 8 (1): 102-118.

11 Pattynama, *op. cit.*, supra note 9

12 Surprisingly, the narrative of successful assimilation not only dominates Dutch public opinion but is upheld in many life stories of the Indo-Dutch themselves. Pattynama who also a descendant of Indo-Dutch immigrant found in her 2000 study that after enforced migration, these people found themselves in an ethnocentric society and were bound to internalize the cultural values of the Dutch community by forfeiting their mixed culture. One of the Indo-Dutch women confessed to Pattynama, "We were forced to keep silent, to forget our life stories and family histories, and on top of that we were, to our dismay, outrageously disgraced as traitors and colonizers. But we managed becoming good Dutch citizens." See *Op. cit.*, supra note 11.

13 Inserted in this group are Mollucans, Surinamese, Turks, and Somalians. Critiquing the failure of multiculturalism in Netherlands as leading to 'anything goes', Scheffer insist in his 'Multicultural Drama' (2000) for more national pride (nationalism) and cultural assimilation with indifference to remedy the situation. See Essed, P. and Nimako, K. (2006). Designs and (Co)Incidents: Culture of Scholarships and Public Policy on Immigrants/Minorities in the Netherlands. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 47 (3-4): 281-312.

14 Language euphemism alongside the false conception of what race, ethnicity, and multicultural society is, explains the way the discourse on minority in Netherlands has been put under the carpet. Only after the assassination of Pym Fortuyn (May 2002) and Theo Van Gogh (November 2004), with the 'Islam=Backward' paradigm, had the discourse of minorities come to the fore. Prior this media hype in early 2000, few scholars or journalist took any cue on criticizing injustice among minorities. Partial explanation why there was a great void of advocacy on minority discourse was getting through the highly dependency among researchers from research groups and institutions to government funds. Until early 1980s, research on minority groups in Netherlands which were scattered and sporadic had mostly been conducted by social geographers and anthropologists. Both parties however produced studies that generally descriptive, superficial in theory, and suffering from one-sidedness in their conceptual framework. *Ibid.*

15 Anthias, F. (2002). Where Do I Belong? Narrating Collective Identity and Translocational Positionality. *Ethnicities*, Vol. 2 (4): 491-514. <http://etn.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/2/4/491> [Accessed 24/10/2009].

16 Pattynama, *op. cit.*, supra note 9.

17 Bhabha, H. K. (1994). Of Mimicry and Men: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse. In: *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge, p. 121-122.

18 Boot, N., Brederode, W., and Krancher, J. A. (2006). The Rise of New Generation: The Dutch-Indonesian Cultural Renaissance in the Netherlands (online). <http://www.coert.org/indonesia/TheRiseOfANewGeneration.htm> [Accessed 12/11/2009].

19 *Ibid.*

20 Anderson, K. (2008). 'Race' in Post-Universalist Perspectives. *Cultural Geographies*, Vol. 15 (2): 155-171. <http://cgj.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/15/2/155> [Accessed 21/08/2009]

21 Parry, B. (1987). Problem in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse. *Oxford Literary Review*, Vol. 9 (1-2): 27-58.

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