



CHALLENGING GOVERNMENT POLICIES: FPI's Role on Enforcing Laws and Act of Humanities

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Abstract

During Jokowi's administration, some government policies do not fit with the Indonesian Islamic Group. Accused to be a hardliner, the government disbanded the Islamic Defender Front or FPI. Nevertheless, many public supports were still gained by this organization, even after their leader, the charismatic Habis Rizieq Shibab imprisoned. This study explains why FPI manages to keep its popularity and political support from elites. Using fieldwork, library studies, descriptive analysis in qualitative research method, the result shows how FPI's working on law enforcement and humanitarian action influence the opinion of the public, especially those who come from a pious Muslim background.

Keywords: Policy, Indonesia, Islam, FPI, Humanity

Abstrak

Pada masa pemerintahan Jokowi, beberapa kebijakan pemerintah harus berhadapan dengan Kelompok Islam Indonesia. Front Pembela Islam atau FPI yang dituduh sebagai Islam garis keras, kemudian dibubarkan oleh pemerintah. Meskipun demikian, organisasi ini masih mendapat banyak dukungan public, bahkan setelah pemimpinnya, Habis Rizieq Shibab yang kharismatik berhasil dipenjarakan. Tulisan ini menjelaskan mengapa FPI berhasil mempertahankan popularitasnya serta tetap mendapat dukungan politik dari para elit. Dengan menggunakan studi pustaka, studi lapangan, analisis deskriptif dan metode penelitian kualitatif, hasil kajian menunjukkan bagaimana FPI bergerak pada sisi penegakan hukum dan melakukan berbagai aksi kemanusiaan yang kemudian mempengaruhi opini publik, terutama bagi mereka yang berasal dari kelompok Muslim yang taat.

Kata kunci: Kebijakan, Indonesia, Islam, FPI, Kemanusiaan

Introduction

In a recent development, Indonesian Foreign Policy is colored with Public Diplomacy that stresses the importance of Moderate Islam values in public life. Indonesia succeeds in convincing other nations that there is no place for Islamic violence and terrorism. However, the Islamic Defender Front (Front Pembela Islam - FPI), the main protagonist of Islamic Hardliners, continued its activities until it was banned at the end of December 2020. Its Great Leader (*Imam Besar*), Habib Rizieq Shihab





(HRS) arrested and faced several allegations in court. Despite being cornered by the government and always standing on the other side of government policies, FPI's leader HRS was proposed to be "Man of the Year" by several elites. This proposal was then supported by the Chairman of House of Regional Representatives La Nyalla Mahmud Mattalitti and the end of 2021.

Indonesian society is famous for its tolerance and anti-violence characteristic. At least, it is often said by various community leaders or aspired by the people in the lower classes. The riots and horizontal conflicts that have occurred since President Suharto's downfall did not make the Indonesian people disagree about rejecting this violence. Some cases such as the murder of clerics in East Java with accusations of witchcraft, Ambon Conflict, Sampit Conflict, riots in Lombok, up to Free Aceh Movement rejection of the Indonesian government are not considered as the character of Indonesian people; as well as other violence in the name of religion such as cases of terrorism and persecution of other religions. Some cases that are often considered to be not resolved properly are the case of the establishment of houses of worship, persecution of Shi'as and Ahmadia minority, and cases of blasphemy.

FPI is one of the actors who are often involved in various incidents of violence. FPI's refusal to establish the Yasmin church in Bogor, the attack on Ahmadia and Shi'a people, and persecution of people who were considered the actor who defamed the religion has become news that frequently appears in the mass media.

The establishment of the FPI began in 1998 when there were many indiscretions even at the lowest level of society. The proliferation of private security organizations was balanced by the FPI, which was more religious. Like others, they also emerge as *PAM Swakarsa* (self-initiative community securities). Many sources stated that the founding of FPI was also related to the Indonesian Armed Forces in 1998, which was initiated by the Armed Forces Commander, General Wiranto.

FPI's activities as a whole are subtle from the mass media coverage. Not many community members know about FPI's management structure. They only knew the general chairman, who was sometimes referred to as the great leader - *Imam Besar*, HRS. Some political scientists also observe another central figure in FPI's activities, Munarman, who often acts as chairman of the Legal Team.





Another person involved in the FPI was Mahendradatta, who often presented himself as a lawyer for the Muslim Defenders Team.

FPI is better known to people because of its members' many reports about violence committed. They have a fairly high standard in applying the teachings of Islamic religion, especially in the possibility of apostasy or the prevention of bad deeds. In various regions in Jakarta, FPI is often involved in raids initiated by them in eradicating liquor, gambling, and prostitution. This action directly connects with the law structure and the police, who are more entitled to deal with problems of criminal, social deviation, or other violations of law. In some cases, FPI became hated and had to deal with societies that abandoned the moral values and supporters of freedom. In other cases, FPI has to deal with legal defenders who consider the case was not the authority of FPI. Sometimes FPI has to deal directly with police who assume that immoral activities are legal activities with legal protection. For instance, it happens in the case of Alexis entertainment, which is a place of gambling and prostitution. Alexis was finally closed when Jakarta was led by Governor Anies Baswedan, whose FPI was also a supporter of him in the election process. At following times many FPI's nights sweeping activities had been replaced by police who later specifically formed a Jaguar Team that handled social crimes, deviation, or other criminal violations that occurred at night.

Various news stations such as Metro TV, Kompas TV, Media Indonesia Daily, Kompas Daily, all kinds of Online Media suggest that this FPI is a criminal group that justified itself by carrying the value of Islamic religion. The idea of FPI as a criminal group is actually in line with some foreign thinkers such as Mark Woodward. He agrees that FPI is a violent and criminal actor in Indonesia (Woodward et al., 2013).

This study challenges Mark Woodward's thinking, which states three faces in the FPI movement. Woodward said that FPI could appear with its face in the form of a peaceful civilian people; secondly, FPI could appear in a face full of violence which always blames its enemies; and the third was a face that invited members and supporters to attack and if necessary killed FPI enemies (Woodward et al., 2013). FPI can be very brutal and dangerous if it considers itself a true religious group. If one of its members just comes as an ordinary person and separates from his group, FPI members will be very polite and behave as good people. According to Woodward, FPI usually attacks





minority groups with no official status and protection in society. Many groups within the government (including the police) do not want to disband or face FPI directly because they are afraid that they will be deemed non-Islamic, or indeed they are sympathetic to the objectives of the FPI and ignore their criminal actions.

This study offers only one face of FPI, which is the face of Islam by eradicating crime or sin according to Islam and giving humanitarian assistance to anyone who needs it by delivering Islamic teachings that are full of love, peace, and humanity. The Islamic concept is derived from the word *salaam* (peace), bringing *rahmatan lil 'alamin* (blessing to the universe). The explanation in this study will begin with a debate about FPI, Islam, and Violence; after that, it will continue with the social role of FPI in upholding morality and law and closed with FPI's humanitarian activities.

Method of Research

This study is based on two kinds of methods: library study and fieldwork research. A library study is needed to describe the Islamic ideas and sermons supporting FPI. At the same time, fieldwork research is done to find the activities connected to those ideas and sermons in everyday life and the interaction with another group and government policies. The data are collected from the library (such as books, magazines, journals, newspapers, and websites), interviews, and field observation. Data organized through descriptive analysis. This study uses the qualitative research method, which is, to sum up, the general thinking and result of the study.

Literature Review: Debates on Violence, FPI, and Islam.

Many opinions emerge from community leaders about FPI. Most of them regret the acts of violence committed by these organizations. Many of them also defend the victims of FPI's actions which were considered vigilant and violate the law. However, to say that FPI is a criminal or subversive organization. President Indonesia Jokowi is a figure who has received much criticism from FPI. However, prior to disbandment in 2020, Jokowi chose not to comment on the FPI and used another way to deal with Islamic groups. For example, at the end of 2016, when there was much rejection of Ahok, who was accused of blasphemy, Jokowi only used the satire that he delivered at





the opening of the NU Muslimat Congress. Jokowi does not mention the FPI when reporters ask him about Islamic organizations invited to the Presidential Palace. Wiranto, a former armed forces commander and then serving as the coordinating minister for politics, law, and security, also did not want and was unable to dissolve the FPI. However, there were many demands from the public. FPI is also considered to have committed more criminal acts than the HTI that dissolved in May 2017. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Chairman of an Islamic Party, a well-known lawyer, and constitutional law expert defend FPI in many cases. One of the FPI leader Habib Muchsin Alatas was nominated by the Crescent Star Party (Yusril's Party) as a Legislative Candidate in the 2019 election from the West Java electoral district.

Nadirsyah Hosen, chairman of the Executive Board of the special NU Australia branch, also give many comments on FPI. His criticism of FPI often focuses on activities and personal matters. He expresses his comments through social media, Twitter and his website. At the same time, the issue of FPI, which commits a crime as an organization and needs to be dissolved, does not get Hosen's attention. He even pays more attention to the disbandment of HTI, which according to him, is a good policy of Jokowi's government (see also, Hosen, 2012). Hosen's comments and opinion are not the same as the chairman of the NU Executive Board, Said Aqil Siradj, who states that FPI must be disbanded. FPI is considered provocative, disturbing public order, and abusing the good name of Islam that loves peace and is unrelated to violence. On many occasions, debates are found between the chairman of the NU Executive Board and FPI Chairman Habib Rizieq Shihab. They were delivered through sermons and then circulated on social media. Unfortunately for those who disagree with Said Aqil Siradj (who in 2014 supported President Candidate Prabowo Subianto and in the 2019 presidential election in favor of Jokowi), he is deemed not to have a personal interest in disbandment because NU Banser activities have had clashed with FPI activities in many public events (Hadi, 2017). Ahmad Sahal, a researcher from the United States, the Chair of the NU Special Branch in the United States, is bolder in expressing opinions on FPI. In various statements on his Twitter, Sahal said that FPI is just an Islamic thug with a robe, FPI is damaging the image of Islam, and FPI must be dissolved.

Mahfud MD, a professor who is also a former head of the constitutional court, has a different view of FPI. He always advocates that the dissolution of FPI can happen if FPI is considered to have





committed violence and overstepped government policies in carrying out its activities. Mahfud, who is from the NU circle, often criticizes the chairman of the FPI, Habib Rizieq Shihab, who was considered too excessive and often provocative in responding to government policies and social conditions in this country (Makin, 2017). However, Mahfud strongly defended Habib Rizieq when the FPI chairman was exposed to slandering rumors. Another Muslim scholar is Ahmad Syafii Maarif. The former chairman of Muhammadiyah, who is usually called Buya Syafii, is very strict in addressing FPI. According to him, FPI should not be ignored and opposed (As'ad, 2016). He also encouraged the disbandment of the FPI, which he considered to be a follower of mortal theology.

Views of religion and violence in Islam have arisen from the time of the collapse of the USSR. When capitalism was no longer getting resistance from communism, it sought a new opponent, namely Islam. Unfortunately, Islam is always defined as a religion spread by the sword and very close to violent behavior and terrorism. Samuel Huntington's thoughts in *The Clash of Civilization*, which was first published in *Foreign Affairs* magazine in 1993 and later appeared as his book in 1996, became the main premise in international politics (Huntington, 1996). Huntington states that Islam is unique and in opposition to the basic values of western culture, especially in the fields of egalitarianism and modernism. This idea then emerged in various international analyzes related to Islam and violence, especially after the events of 911, namely the bombing of the WTC building in the United States. However, social science has many facts which prove that civilization is not homogeneous or only has monolithic actors who tend to clash. Social science shows the number of plural, divergent, and convergent actors, and they also change constantly (Grim and Finke, 2011). The idea of the clash of civilizations then is not sufficient to explain disputes between two different civilizations and the encounter and the divergence within a civilization (Cesari, 2015). In this case, FPI is a type of conflict and difference that lies within Indonesian civilization but is confronted with a government that is considered to be secular.

The weakness of Huntington's thesis is to designate Islam as opposed to capitalism, while all religions teach more or less the same thing. Christianity also embraces Islamic values that reject homosexuality. Even the term sodomy comes from the holy book of Christianity. The existence of heaven and hell and punishment for evil people also occur in all religions. Likewise, in matters of





violence, all major religions contain teachings of violence, which are usually seen from descriptions of wars in the scriptures. There is a war story within Islam that tells how to behave in war, and Christianity also teaches the same thing. The story of David and Goliath and various other verses also talk about the war. In Hinduism, even Lord Shiva is known as the Demolisher God and many stories about the Bharata Yudha war. Buddhism also has stories or teachings through the monkey king who always fought to save the monk on his way to the west looking for the holy book.

There are also many historical stories about the development of the kingdom which were carried out in religion. The Glorious Maurya dynasty in India, carry out the teaching of Hinduism. Kubilai Khan came to power in China, Mongolia, and Central Asia with countless massacres but still Buddhist. Christianity developed in Latin America by fighting the indigenous people before the arrival of Portugal and Spain; Islam was often used as an excuse for the Ottoman Empire to attack Europe. It does not include the crusade war that brought out Islam and Christianity, which lasted seven times. Violence is indeed found in all religious teachings, which has been proven by history throughout the world. It is how adherent understands the teachings that must be considered, not the religious teaching or the leader. Understanding teaching correctly and thoroughly will bring peace and not cause significant damage.

In the teachings of Islam and especially in Indonesia, FPI is considered to have its interpretation that legalizes the use of violence. FPI attacks and speaks hatefully to those who have a different understanding. It includes the sect Islam that does not follow the mainstream interpretation and is considered sinful. According to Mark Woodward, the hate speech from FPI often received protection from the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), which also stated that the actions of FPI's opponents were violating religious teaching. If his actions do not support the MUI, FPI will provide its definition because having different interpretations is quite common in Islamic teachings (Woodward et al., 2013).

Minority groups such as liberal Islam, Islamic universities, pluralist Islam and Christian minorities are subjected to intimidation. It is, even more, happening to those who try to build churches in areas with a majority of Muslims. All of those groups can be physically or verbally attacked. Minority Muslim groups outside of Sunni Mainstream teachings include the Shi'a, Ahmadia (who





believes that its leader is a Prophet), and mystical groups of Javanese culture then become subject to FPI's curses and attack. Specific deviations of groups if gay, lesbian and transgender people also get harassed and harmed. Scholars like Crouch (2009), Menchik (2007), and several others indicate that MUI is the organization responsible for promoting the atmosphere of religious intolerance. It may not be done directly by the MUI. However, it has provided a framework for thinking and truth for FPI and its associate to commit violence on the grounds of defending Indonesia and defending Islam. MUI sees religious minorities as a threat to the Islamic community, so their existence cannot be tolerated. Violence and coercion are examples of very strong hate speech, as Richardson (2011) observe, which uses negative representation from minority groups as a social weapon in controlling and vilifying them (Woodward et al., 2013).

When Indonesia went through a period of reform, two forces influenced society. The first is a new force that seeks to apply the basic values of democracy; the second is the old force that tries to regain power. These forces take place individually in other countries, and one overcomes the other. In Indonesia, both parties are united and appear as new forces that endorse homogeneity based on moral and religious values. This power then justifies discrimination and violence based on moral and religious values. As a result, the intolerance perspective is strengthened along with the violent incident in Indonesia. The distinctions among law, legislation, and religious teachings are blurred. Religious minorities get oppressed because they are considered to violate the teachings of major religions, freedom of expression is constrained by many moral restrictions, and even some discriminatory regulations arise against a minority group. It is also an extent to law court where judges' decisions always corner minority groups. According to Ismail Hasani (in Lindsey and Pausaker, 2016), all the values and events then become the Indonesian government's challenge, especially on carrying out the main element of democracy, which is the freedom of civil society.

Regarding the freedom of civil society, Woodward offers two explanations that can be used as references to explain the relationship between FPI and the government of Indonesia. The first is that the Indonesian government does not have any courage to deal with FPI or that the government cannot control various acts of violence committed by FPI. The second is that the government actually agreed to FPI's actions and supported them secretly. It happens because the government needs groups





like FPI to smoothen its political agenda. FPI leader Habib Rizieq Shihab is known for his ability to make speeches that can arouse the enthusiasm of his followers, and he certainly can use various symbols and religious verses to achieve his goals. In line with it, Habib Rizieq Shihab and other FPI leaders also successfully managed to get community support, especially those thirsty for religious advice. For people who seek purification, supporting FPI means obeying religious teaching and getting closer to God. It was also supported by a statement from FPI that they supported the government or state apparatus in implementing the law. FPI supports the police in preventing deviation in society and protecting people from sin. At the same time, FPI also succeeded in gaining support from the community on carrying out actions to condemn various people's behaviors which it deemed inappropriate, and at the same time announce it as a reason to commit violence. The two explanations offered by Indonesian experts and international experts are interrelated (Woodward et al., 2013). The government and the public are well aware of the potential of FPI to commit violence. The government and its supporting officials are also aware that FPI can do what the political elite wants, even if they do not say it directly.

The Indonesian government is aware that two conflicting circumstances surround them. On the one hand, the reform towards democracy carried out since 1998 gave freedom to the people to speak out; but at the same time, it opposed the use of violence in handling groups that have not have the same view as the government. If the government oppresses FPI, it has to face resistance or even political attack from those who agree with FPI's goals, although they do not necessarily agree with the methods used by FPI. On the other hand, if the FPI is being ignored, many bad things will happen (Woodward et al., 2013). In the short term, the government will deal with groups that support human rights, which usually support the government in elections. However, in the long run, this will give the rights of various groups in the community to carry out violence and oppression independently. Moreover, FPI can bring together various groups with the same goals, such as FUI, DDII, and other Salafi groups.

The use of violence by Islamic groups is not something new. Violence has become an internal part of Islamic culture and society. Violence is also often carried out by various Islamic groups in many countries worldwide. Many types of research and polls have been conducted to see this





development. From 2001 to 2007, the Gallup Poll of Muslims conducted polls in 35 countries to see how far people see themselves. The result is that the community's main pride is strong confidence and faith in their religion. They are also proud that they are part of people from an Arab country or an Islamic state. According to spiritual and moral values, life is the most important thing. Nevertheless, at the same time, they also realized that the biggest threat to their cultural and religious identity came from occupation and political oppression (Esposito, 2015).

Cases of violence by Islamic groups in opposition to political oppression can be seen in the resistance of the Hamas group to the Israeli occupation of Palestine. They get justification for their ideologies which may commit violence to gain independence. For Palestinian people, the Hamas group has high credibility and legitimacy. However, as in other religions, Islam actually emphasizes spiritual goals, avoids violence, and always prioritizes peace. In the Qur'an, there is also a verse that forbids humans to eliminate the human soul, which is realized as something sacred. It has the same idea as what is written in the bible "thou shall not kill." The name Islam itself comes from the word *salaam*, which means peace. It is similar to the word Shalom that the Jews used.

For this reason, more Islamic groups in the world prioritize peace or non-violent strategies. One of Jamaah Islamiyya's leaders related to international terrorism, Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, even said that true Muslims would never use violence. True Muslims will use love, forgiveness, and tolerance. It was said after the cases of the WTC bombing in America. However, Sheik Omar also added that if Muslims were attacked or their territory occupied, then Muslims would fight back to stop the violence carried out by the attackers.

Another expert, Formichi, did not focus on the issue of violence in Islamic teachings. She recognizes violence more as a result of changes of structure in society as well as the result of the transformation of the state. For example, after the period of reform in Indonesia, the anti-Shi'a actions turn to become full of violence. It is different from the previous period when the anti-Shi'a movement happened only as a response. Formichi found out that various anti-Shi'a Islamic groups emerged and ignited many conflicts. It happens related to others. The same thing happened to the anti-Ahmadia movement. The problem is that this switching action of movement occurs because the role changes ulemas who joined the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) in its relations to the state. Initially, MUI





was just an obedient servant of state policy. However, after the reform period, the MUI dominated by conservative groups strongly influenced the government in the policymaking process (Formichi, 2014).

The Indonesian Ulema Council usually serves as the highest reference in various religious decisions in Indonesia. Nevertheless, some researchers look at other sources in gaining social legitimacy and the basis of law-making in society. Some places in Indonesia believe that *adat* (local customs) also has an important role and religion. In the case of Indonesia, many anthropologists even have argued that *adat* gets a higher position than religion. The entry of religion into society must get the approval of *adat*. Thus, in many places in Indonesia, religion must adapt to *adat*. The entry of religion can only be done if it pays attention to and accepts *adat* what was present first there. Some community groups in Indonesia show examples of how *adat* is more accepted in transferring public trust to both Islam and Christianity. Patrick Guinness raises several solutions in this *adat* and religious affairs. For example, *adat* is indeed different from religion. Then in the case of Indonesia, *adat* can also be used to overcome the differences between Islam and Christianity in society. It can happen because *adat* offers a different form of a ritual than that offered by religion. Moreover, *adat* rituals can be carried out by all religious adherences (Guinness, 2015).

Other experts such as Hefner (as quoted by Hamayotsu) did not see that *adat* is important in preventing violence; despite that, he focused on Islamic teachings and the laws applied by the state. According to him, Islam indeed focuses on the detailed explanation of worship, marriage, and trade, while in law and constitution, Islamic teachings explain it in general. As a result, there are many interpretations of Islamic teaching that can be beneficial to one group. Government affairs and the law-making process depend on the political and the religious elite's interests. Because the explanation of religion is very general and there are many numbers interpretation, people can apply Sharia or Islamic law or form an Islamic state based on their desire. This situation will only lead to divisions in the community and rising conflicts within them. Conservative Islamic supporters also used this difference to apply their version of Sharia rigidly by using pressure, force, and violence (Hamayotsu, 2014).





Trials to apply Islamic law are carried out many times by Islamic countries, including Indonesia. Normally what they mean by Islamic law is the law followed by classical scholars understand that. In its application, four fields will become a problem between Muslims and other religions, including the non-mainstream school of Islam. Fatima Zainab Rahman saw this in the case of the Ahmadia group in Indonesia and Pakistan. She found that tension would increase if Islamic law were applied according to classical Islamic thought. The four areas that will become problems are testimonies at the law court, requirements to become head of state, religious conversion, and law in the family (Rahman, 2014).

Conflicts will usually occur if this is related to other religions or non-mainstream Islamic schools. Furthermore, this will lead to government policy problems, especially towards minority groups and the issue of religious freedom.

Ulemas usually agree that Islam prohibits coercion and violence in religious matters. There is a Qur'an verse that specifically prohibits the elimination of human life. However, many scholars also agree that in various circumstances, violence is indeed needed or even encouraged. For example, penalties in violation of religion (and social relations in society) are applied by the process of coercion and violence. Likewise, if the state is in a state of war, violence is recommended in the context of the war itself. It was explained by Juergensmeyer, who also stated that the war was not merely a suggestion from religious ideas but was indeed a means to survive a people and its civilization. In the Islamic religion, this is often associated with jihad, which means to try with a big effort. In various hadith, jihad is also translated more as "refraining from doing evil" and not as a holy war which has recently become a translation of the jihad and is often used by individuals who do not understand Islamic teachings. Even Islam does not recommend converting religion to Islam because of pressure or coercion, especially with violence. Islam only wants people to convert to Islam because of his faith and compliance with their rational beliefs and thoughts (Juergensmeyer, 2000).

In the case of the Islam and Christian conflicts in Ambon (Indonesia), the ulema's has a considerable role in preparing the army before carrying out physical battle. As explained by al-Qurtuby, the ulema gave a sermon to Islamic fighters before they left for war. The ulema usually emphasized things that should not be done in warfare. It includes the prohibition of insulting the





enemy's religion, issuing obscenities, stealing or robbing, and getting drunk. The ulema also warns the fighter to keep practicing daily prayer five times, even in a bad situation. For people known to be thieves or gamblers, it is not even permissible to join this paramilitary group. It was done to maintain the purifying of the Islamic army battle that was carried out to defend Islam (Qurtuby, 2015).

There are so many debates about Islam as a religion of peace and violence. It shows us that scientists are not in the same view about Islam. It can be a religion of violence or peace, or it depends on how its adherence acts in the community. The appearance of the FPI in Indonesia is also still debated whether they only commit violence without regard to the moral values, religious values, and government law systems that apply in Indonesia; or they also do some other things that show Islam is a religion of peace and full of humanitarian values.

Discussion: FPI's Effort on Enforcing Laws

FPI tends to carry out the commands of the Islamic religion called *Amar ma'ruf nahi Munkar* (inviting the good and preventing the bad) with *nahi Munkar* as the main idea in FPI's actions because the ulema who preaches *Amar ma'ruf* were many. The main sermon carried out by many preachers focused on *Amar ma'ruf*. Then who prevents *Munkar*? The police, who are expected to prevent the crime at various times, do not care about the public, especially the fortune of the small community. The police even seemed to want to benefit from a small community. Police support *Munkar* because they get extra income. Some examples of preachers focus on *Amar ma'ruf*, like AA Gym, Yusuf Mansur, Arifin Ilham, et cetera. Even the NU clerics tend to be permissive to various irregular social symptoms. The pluralist and liberal Islamic groups tend to have *Amar ma'ruf*. However, they are considered to have been influenced by western values, full of freedom and deviated from the Islamic religion.

In carrying out his violence, FPI tends to see social diseases in the community. This activity is also carried out within the legal framework because FPI is confident that all bad deeds in society have been legally prohibited. If it is not contained in state law, regional law can see the rules. It cannot be found in regional law; the FPI can use moral norms and ethics in the community. Managing unavailable in regional law is that it disrupts the public interest. Furthermore, the last reason is to





return to Pancasila, where the first principle is to Believe in One God. Thus, applying religious rules also means applying the Pancasila.

FPI has started its activities in law enforcement which it called *nahi Munkar*, in 1999. In that year, FPI had succeeded in closing the gambling site in Petojo and the brothel in Ciputat, Tanah Abang, Jakarta. They also closed a discotheque that allegedly functioned as a prostitution place. FPI again closed discos and other entertainment venues in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. They were quite hard in eradicating immoral places in Jakarta. In various cases, the police must work hard enough. They arrested Habib Rizieq Shihab, the head of the FPI, and Tubagus Sidik, the field coordinator. As a result, Habib Rizieq Shihab was sentenced to seven months in prison.

In the following years, FPI moved towards politics and safeguarded religion so that it was not poisoned by western ideologies that were considered liberal or new Islamic ideologies that were considered heretical. Various actions against national and international politics were carried out, including demonstrations at the United States embassy. They also pressured the government by rejecting the Jakarta governor Sutiyoso. President Megawati also got a claim from FPI regarding the decline in fuel prices.

The rest actions of the FPI are very concerned about the condition of the community so that they can live more Islamic, which according to FPI, is following the religion embraced by the community. So FPI rejects the shemale congress, the Beauty Contest, which is feared to be wearing mini clothes, discussions about homosexuality, and guarding food stalls that try to open during the day, during the month of Ramadan, where Muslims are fasting. As a result, several food stalls were damaged by FPI in 2011.

In addition, the FPI pays attention to the creeds which it considers to have been disturbed by other religions or heretical sects. The FPI had to deal with the police and the law several times because it was deemed to have damaged the house of worship or disturbed the people who were worshiping. The target of the FPI is, of course, the Shi'a and Ahmadia Muslim groups which, according to him, are deviations from the Islamic religion. The FPI also did not hesitate to persecute or intimidate Christian groups who were considered to have done evil things improperly. Whether it is in a place that is not a church, teaches religious ideas to small children, or to missionaries who are considered





to have spread the Christian religion at an inappropriate time and place. Things like this were done throughout 2012, 2013, and 2014.

The positive thing about FPI is that they are often cooperative when dealing with the law. They always prepare a team of lawyers to fight in the court, and they are willing to undertake the sentence if it has become a judge's decision.

FPI's actions occur not only in Jakarta or West Java but also in many other provinces in Indonesia. As in December 2017, for example, the FPI of Riau Islands Province demanded that the police be consistent in combating gambling (Batam Today, 2017). FPI did the same thing in 2014, where FPI urged Satpol PP, the Police, and the TNI to close gambling in the city of Tanjung Pinang jointly. At that time, FPI threatened to move on its own if the government did not close gambling places (Tribun Batam, 2014).

The FPI action also took place in Bandung in 2016 when they carried out sweeping against boarding houses suspected of keeping LGBT people. The FPI argued that LGBT people also carried out immoral acts and drank liquor. They also did the same thing in October 2018 when there were activities suspected of being LGBT in Artos Mall Magelang (Tempo. co, 2016). In addition, FPI also held a demonstration in front of the Grahadi building in Surabaya to reject LGBT (Tribun Jatim 2018).

In prosecuting the problem of sexual crime in the form of prostitution, the FPI also does so in the district of Kendal, Central Java. Although they had clashed with the residents, the FPI's action in closing prostitution still received appreciation from other residents who refused the prostitution. It happened in 2013. In 2016 FPI once again made demands on the East Java government regarding government-owned buildings for prostitution (kiblat.net, 2013). In January 2018, FPI activities were sweeping in Pamekasan, Madura. FPI itself refused to use sweeping terms. He said it was only *tabayyun* (confirmation). However, the FPI insisted that Madura was a santri island, so it was natural to reject prostitution in that place (CNN Indonesia, 2018). In July 2018, FPI of Pekanbaru helped Satpol PP to raid, close, and eradicate prostitution (HalloRiau.com, 2018). In addition, back in Jakarta, FPI also asked the government to pay more attention to the problem of online prostitution, which was increasingly prevalent in Jakarta in 2015. At that time, the FPI only reminded and refused





to take over the task of police and government in enforcing online prostitution (Republika.co.id, 2015).

Discussion: Humanitarian Acts of FPI

FPI's activities which were always full of violence, became easy targets for the media crews, most of whom were not going along with FPI. Nevertheless, behind his appearance that seemed fierce and frightening, FPI also did many social activities. The quite big social activity was the first time was Aceh's reconstruction after the 2004 tsunami. The FPI focused on evacuating bodies and burying dead bodies en masse. No fewer than 2,500 FPI volunteers came to Aceh. Even Habib Rizieq Shihab also participated in the evacuation process. Many touching stories are told about FPI's interactions with the surviving Acehnese. It includes how the FPI members must sleep in the cemetery because there is no good place. After evacuating bodies, the next FPI activity is to prepare survivors, provide health facilities and clean water mentally. For this reason, FPI brought 20 well drill experts from Pasuruan. This activity also proves to the government that FPI fights through violence and evil and with *Amar ma'ruf* in the form of social activities and humanitarian assistance.

The same activity was initiated again in 2018. FPI sent its volunteers to Palu and Donggala for the Tsunami, Earthquake struck, and liquefaction disasters. FPI is the first mass organization to send its volunteers to the disaster. FPI sent volunteers from Palu, from Makassar, and then from Jakarta. They are people who have been trained in assisting in natural disasters. A total of 500 FPI volunteers and then 300 people from Jakarta worked together with the armed forces and other organizations to provide worker assistance in the area of disaster. FPI also sent as many as ten trucks to provide aid to survivors. The aid is given without seeing to the origin of the survivor, whether its tribe, religion, or political support. All victims who requested basic food to the FPI were immediately given without showing ID cards or other documents.

When looking at the experience of social assistance that has been carried out since 2004, it is certainly not strange if the FPI army is very good at doing it. The problem is that the mass media do not cover most FPI activities, and they are doing it without hoping so; the public does not hear them. Before assisting victims in Central Sulawesi, FPI also helped earthquake survivors in Lombok. FPI,





which moves through HILMI (Hilal Merah Indonesia), part of FPI engaged in the humanitarian field, immediately came to Lombok. They provided aid in sarongs and various physical aid needed in the field. HILMI-FPI improves clean water channels that are buried by landslides, helps a child with a broken leg, and checks the structure of a damaged building, and if necessary, demolishes it because it can bring danger.

The same thing was done by FPI when a massive volcanic eruption occurred in Bali in October 2017. HILMI-FPI supplied aid of 2.5 tons of rice to refugees. It is added with 36 boxes of instant noodles and 26 eggs. All direct assistance was given to the village there, Gede Sudarsa. Previously FPI also moved directly in a Flood disaster in Bima, NTB, in January 2017. In addition to the many FPI volunteers, they also sent 2 tons of aid in food, clothing, and medicine. A month later, Habib Rizieq complained about the media never covering FPI's humanitarian activities. He said the FPI activities broadcasted on the TV were only about fighting, while humanitarian activities are never.

FPI's humanitarian activities deal with natural disasters, and various other assistance carried out in Jakarta and its surroundings. The main assistance requested by the community is, of course, security, where the FPI is considered a powerful force to drive out thugs or criminals who often threaten or scare the population in a residential area. Those who gamble and drink alcoholic beverages, harassing the people who pass by, will immediately leave if the housing administrators bring in FPI. Therefore, if people in one area ask for FPI's assistance, they will feel safe. Those who do not feel safe are those who love immorality and sin.

In various places in Jakarta, the FPI has repeatedly helped if there were cases of fire. It has always been the case since 2012. Fire events in Pondok Bambu in August 2012, in the Kampung Melayu in August 2017, in Bogor in December 2017, in Taman Sari in January 2018, and FPI even helped extinguish fires when the shophouses were owned by Chinese ethnic caught fire in Jelambar in September 2018. In this incident, FPI also helped an elderly Chinese person trapped on the 3rd floor to survive the fire. Similar things are also often done by FPI in Jakarta in the case of floods.

Conclusion





Mark Woodward built his argument by saying that the FPI was more violent and threatened other parties. So FPI is a criminal who must stop his activities. FPI is also considered to represent the Islamic group as a whole. Many scientists agree with this idea and mostly depart from Huntington's thesis on the Clash of Civilization. The scholar who opposed the idea of the connection of Islam with violence and the use of violence for religious purposes was Mark Juergensmeyer. This study supports the thesis of Juergensmeyer and rejects Woodward's argument.

In addition to strong religious and law-based ideologies prevailing in Indonesia, FPI's activities also focused on eradicating social crime (which Woodward defined as dispossession of liberty) and many other activities closely related to humanity. FPI's humanitarian activities can be assisting survivors of natural disasters, dropping volunteers working in areas affected by the disaster, and can also be in the form of participation in the assistance of communities around the residence.

FPI carries out all *Nahi Munkar* activities (crime prevention) within the Indonesian legal corridor. FPI understands Indonesian law and sticks to it. Habib Rizieq Shihab, the head of the FPI, has been jailed twice and served a prison term as an ordinary person. There is no privilege for him, no destruction, and no mobilization of the masses.

All activities and groups sent by the FPI violate applicable laws, such as the prohibition of gambling, the prohibition of prostitution, and the prohibition of the establishment of places of worship if there are not enough followers of the religion in that place. According to FPI, there is a complement between Islam and Pancasila. It was Muslims who founded this country and who also designed the Pancasila. The FPI strongly believes that all who violate Islam also violate the Pancasila and vice versa. For the translation of Sharia law, FPI is based on the MUI Fatwa. Although the Fatwa of the MUI often does not receive recognition from some "very soft Muslim" or liberal scholars. All of this explains that FPI based itself on Islam, and the face of FPI was the face of Islam in Indonesia.





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